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Abstract

Simulated combat requires knowledge of how both friendly and enemy forces are
progressing relative to the stated friendly objectives and the believed enemy objectives. In the Department of Defense (DoD), the structure of these objectives is hierarchical, from the national strategic level down to the tactical level. Military assessment
seeks to answer two primary questions: 1) are we creating the effects that we desire?
and 2) are we accomplishing tasks to standard? Little research has been conducted in
assessment methodologies for simulated combat. Some predominant assessment application arenas are education and gaming, which provide useful lessons for military
combat assessment within a simulation. This work steps through several desirable
characteristics for a simulated combat assessment methodology gleaned from DoD
policy and these areas of research. After developing a value hierarchy from these
characteristics, this thesis provides and evaluates several candidate methodologies
for use within a combat simulation – the existing Combat Effectiveness & Combat
Vulnerability methodology within the Bayesian Enterprise Analysis Model (BEAM),
Bayesian Networks, Value-Focused Thinking, and Linear Programming. Each alternative’s evaluation is informed by its application to a small combat simulation. We
then create an alternative from the Value-Focused Thinking and Linear Programming
alternatives with a better evaluation that the other four. The thesis terminates with
some conclusory thoughts on the Linear Programming and ideas for future research.
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COMBAT ASSESSMENT FOR THE SIMULATION OF WARFARE

I. Introduction

Similar to real war, combat simulations require knowledge of how friendly and
enemy forces are progressing. This knowledge extends potential simulation stopping
conditions beyond the temporal and allows for the analysis of progress in relation
to time, money, and asset posture. While recording the destruction of assets and
utilization of consumables may provide worthy analytical results, commanders are
often interested in the broader question, did this scenario result in a win or a loss?
To answer this question, a simulation must contain some definition of winning or
losing. This is most simply attained via stated objectives to complete. Combat
simulation must be able to assess the operational environment and report progress
toward or from these objectives. From the concrete (e.g., destroy all enemy ports)
to the more abstract (e.g., achieve naval superiority) objectives, a singular combat
assessment methodology inside of a simulation should be versatile enough to provide
an answer to the win-loss question in the face of many different definitions of winning.
This thesis provides an answer to such a methodology to be used in campaign-level
combat assessment for simulated war.
A straightforward definition of assessment is “the process of using data to demonstrate that stated goals and objectives are actually being met” (1, p. 554). In the
defense realm, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) define assessment as “a
continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations” (2). In general, assessment is a word used for
continual or ongoing feedback intended to improve a process. In more formal settings,
1

assessment is divided into two categories: summative and formative. Summative assessment, or what some may term as evaluation, performs post-hoc reviews of performance. Examples of summative assessment include simple grading and comparisons
to a benchmark and statistical or other analytical methods for obtaining comparative
results from process outputs. The “external” (3, p. 19) characteristic of summative
assessment naturally leads to its presentation of results as distant and/or static. Some
examples of summative assessment include yearly personnel reviews and appraisals,
student exams, and business metrics reporting. Alternatively, formative assessment
focuses on continuous learning processes, intended to provide feedback during a given
process (4). In education, formative assessment includes a collaboration of the student
and the assessor to “actively produce [the student’s] best performance” (5, p. 242).
Interactive in nature, formative assessment intends to enhance performance before a
process is ended, leveraging data (or experience) to customize the aid given to the
assessed party. In this way, formative assessment may also include progress tracking
or reporting. This thesis focuses on formative assessment methodologies within the
context of campaign-level simulated war. We provide a suggestion to the question,
“how should one approach campaign-level combat assessment within a computational
simulation?”
The approach to assessment within a simulation of war, particularly if used for
military training or analysis, should be to mimic actual decision-makers’ assessment of
the war effort. In actual combat contexts, military subordinates and analysts prepare
an assessment for their commanders’ situational awareness. The commanders use the
assessment to provide further direction to manipulate the operational environment.
As we model a war effort within a simulation of combat, the assessment portion
should effectually be a model of the combined subordinate/analyst assessment and
commander feedback. We include this concept in our value hierarchy for combat

2

simulation assessment approaches in Section 3.1. Adjacently, we include the necessary
characteristic that the methodology should be simple in its communication, allowing
for streamlined presentation to commanders and other decision-makers. Useful to
simple communication is the distilling of assessment outcomes into categories (e.g.,
win or loss), which is discussed in more detail in Section 3.1.
As the authoritative source on joint force operations, the United States JCS’s
“Joint Publication 3-0” (2) provides insight into the type of decision-making to be
mimicked. The JCS concern themselves most with “operation assessment,” which is
the process used to “measure progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions
or effects, and achieving objectives” (2, p. II-9). The JCS assert that operation
assessment should “begin during mission analysis when the commander and staff
consider what to measure and how to measure it” (2, p. II-9). For a computational
model employed in the field, this step would occur before the model is run, in which
analysts set the preliminary objectives and any initial parameters. Furthermore, an
“objective” in this definition is a goal that directs a course of action. An objective
may be a phrase, as given in the National Strategic Objective for the DoD, or it
may be the goal of an individual military task. In any case, the objectives within an
assessment methodology for a simulation of war dictate where the proxy commanders’
attention lie and in which direction they suggest movement.
Figure 1 provides the nested relationship between different levels of warfare with
corresponding objectives. Within military applications, the assessment framework
given in the purple arrow of Figure 1 is often called a “strategy-to-task” framework
(6; 7; 8). Beneath objectives in the framework are effects that may be assessed. An
“effect” is “the result, outcome or consequence of an action” (2, p. GL-9). A “task” is
considered to be the smallest unit of military operation, ranging from destruction of
an enemy asset to shipment of materiel. Some tasks are the objectives themselves, and
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some tasks support corresponding objectives with no intermediary effects. However,
as Figure 1 illustrates, higher-level objectives inform lower-level objectives, which in
turn direct military operations at all levels. Meanwhile, assessment is the mechanism
used to provide bottom-up feedback. In the provision of feedback, assessment should
answer two key questions: 1) “are we creating the effect(s) or condition(s) in the
[operational environment] that we desire?” and 2) “are we accomplishing tasks to
standard?” (2, p. II-11).

Figure 1: Interaction of Assessment as Defined by the JCS (2)
The focus of these two central assessment questions naturally leads combat assessment of simulated war to the formative realm. Although analysts have traditionally
answered these questions retroactively using summative assessment methods, formative assessment allows for a reactive simulated combat environment when paired with
the intent of answering the two key questions. With formative assessment methods,

4

the simulation (or commanders) may receive real-time updates of the operational environment status in relation to specific objectives. Rather than performing post-hoc
analyses, formative assessment more closely mimics the real-time war effort of assessing battle damage against friendly forces along with mission debriefs and intelligence
reporting on adversary units. As such, this thesis focuses on formative assessment
methodologies.
The remainder of this thesis is devoted to synthesizing JCS operational assessment requirements into a coherent structure for effective deployment of an assessment
methodology within a combat modeling simulation environment. Gallagher et al (9)
use resolution to define different levels of combat: system/engineering, engagement,
mission, campaign, defense enterprise, and whole government. JCS doctrine establishes that each level of combat resolution be hierarchical in its assessment. This
thesis does not attempt to narrow the scope of assessment to any particular engagement resolution; rather, we present general results in the attempt to apply to the
broadest set of DoD applications possible. This research is focused on answering two
research questions:

Research Questions
1) What are the desired characteristics of a combat assessment methodology
for a programmatic/computerized simulation?
2) How should one conduct combat assessment within a programmatic simulation of warfare?

The next chapter provides an introduction to assessment through other predominant application areas. Taking the lessons learned from Chapter II and JCS assessment guidance, we construct a value hierarchy in Chapter III. Presenting several
5

alternative methodologies for evaluation, we investigate their mechanics in a small
combat simulation in Chapter IV. We then evaluate these alternative assessment
methodologies in Chapter V for use in simulated warfare. Chapter V ends with a
recommendation for a methodology for simulated combat assessment. We provide
some concluding remarks and suggestions for further research in chapter VI.

6

II. Predominant Contributions to Assessment
In this section, we summarize and comment on the efficacy of several assessment
applications. We utilize the various assessment approaches presented to develop a
hierarchy of values in Section 3.1 that may be used to determine the worthiness of assessment approaches for combat simulations. Commencing with the readily recalled
application area of education, we demonstrate how, historically, these assessment
frameworks lack applicability in the combat assessment realm. Continuing with an
example of assessment in games, we comment on the automation of assessment in
chess. In this case, although formative assessment is tackled marvelously, the implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) is not reasonable for a combat simulation due
to technological constraints. A combination of education and gaming is subsequently
presented as a modern and promising area of research that may contribute to combat
assessment within simulated warfare.
The National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) defines an assessment
framework as a “structured conceptual map of the learning outcomes of a programme
of study along with details of how achievement of the outcomes can be measured”
(10). Education is severely lacking in assessment frameworks as the NCBI defines.
Many education assessment methodologies that provide conceptual maps or learning
objectives do not explicitly link student progress to these objectives. Others provide
links between student learning and achievement of objectives via a Likert scale, but
then do not connect these scores to a larger framework. The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IAEEA) provides an archetypal
educational assessment framework (11). Since the IAEEA reaches schools across 55
countries and in every continent (p. 78 – 81), the assessment framework is also
widely accepted. However, the framework is mostly qualitative in nature. As such, it
does not provide a structured conceptual map. While the authors graphically display
7

learning outcomes (p. 61), they do not clearly state the mechanisms through which
learning outcome achievement should be measured.
Some in the educational realm have developed assessment frameworks that have
both the requisite conceptual map and details connecting student learning to achievement of objectives (12; 13; 14). Even so, such frameworks are largely untranslatable
into the context of simulated combat, as educational assessment is historically summative. Standardized testing is a frequently recalled example of the summative nature
of most educational assessment (15). The assessment framework in the context of
these tests includes a calculation of an overall grade-point average (GPA) from individual course grades, which themselves are the composition of individual assignment
and exam grades. Whether the GPA framework is a summative or formative type of
assessment depends on the time context one considers. Over an assignment-level or
lesson-level time frame, the assessment seems more summative. In contrast, a longer
time frame, say a semester or year (or longer), provides ample opportunity for substantial formative assessment. On an assignment level, the minimum requirement for
completion of the assessment of the assignment is typically the assignation of either
a letter (e.g. A, B, C, etc.) or a percentage (0% – 100%). This minimum effort is
clearly summative assessment. A more involved summative feedback could also look
like correction of punctuation or addressing a calculation error. These examples provide the student with knowledge of the error, but do not address the learning deficits
that caused the error. Individualized feedback addressing learning gaps or tips for
how to progress toward a better assessment introduces formative assessment into this
time context. However, with a longer time frame, the assessment takes on a more
complex structure, as individual assignments may be graded dependently, referencing
prior feedback or student errors. In this case, the student learns, perhaps with external encouragement over time, why they are making the mistakes they are making.

8

The time-dependent nature of assessment within education may naturally produce
formative assessment.
The GPA framework is, in part, an analogue of some simulated combat methodologies. Most distinct from the GPA framework applied to education is that simulated
combat lacks the student. The presence of the student obscures the influence of the
GPA framework’s formative assessment, as human psychology intervenes. Computerized simulations do not have this benefit of organic processing and learning. However,
assessment methodologies may be able to address performance gaps within the operational environment. Current methodologies could, for example, explicitly search
and reference past behavior in their feedback mechanisms. While some methodologies grade or otherwise utilize minute combat interactions, others only assess the
aggregate effect of combat maneuvers. A singular value for progress towards scenario
objectives, which is analogous to the overall GPA, is useful in many cases. The GPA
framework does not perfectly translate its formative assessment characteristics into
the assessment of simulated combat. While formative assessment is not explicitly part
of the GPA framework, we recommended that the assessment of simulated combat
incorporates formative assessment explicitly. One way an assessment framework may
instantiate formative assessment is by addressing resource gaps with the achievement
of combat objectives. This concept is related to instructors providing their student(s)
individualized feedback of their learning deficits in order to progress toward classroom
objectives.
The GPA framework also contains another measure of influence for combat assessment. The GPA framework inadvertently implies that its metric, given on a scale
of 0.0 - 4.0, accurately and succinctly summarizes student achievement. As a instan-

9

tiation of the Law of Large Numbers,1 a student’s GPA approximates their actual
(theoretical) average achievement. Translating this into the assessment within simulated combat, we should consider multiple possible next time-steps within a scenario,
rather than a single possible next time-step. We may do this by considering cases
where friendly or enemy assets, or both, are strong, weak, or of medium strength in
the next time-step. By sampling in this fashion, we can form a distribution of performance across the next time step. In this way, we have a two-dimensional application
of the Law of Large Numbers, where having more possible futures sampled gives us a
clearer picture of the theoretical future distribution. It may be of interest to instead
obtain sample means of these levels of performance. In this case, the Law of Large
Numbers becomes two-dimensional, otherwise known as the Central Limit Theorem.
In either case, modeling variability within a simulation – a highly volatile context – is
advantageous. Therefore, distributional results would enhance an assessment framework for simulated combat. In building the value hierarchy in Section 3.1, we consider
that the distributional output of an assessment framework for simulated combat is
one approach to recording the partial completion of objectives and categorization into
win, loss, or unresolved.
Simulated war also requires a well-defined assessment framework capable of quantitative integration with a feedback loop within a scenario. Research into games such
as chess has more recently involved applying search algorithms via AI to master the
game. A prominent example and breakthrough in AI technology is IBM’s AlphaZero,
which uses Monte Carlo Decision Trees as a basis for its in-game play (17). Rather
than an explicit assessment framework, however, machine learning applications create
models by training them on data. The model attempts to select the best move pro1

First proved by Jakob Bernoulli in 1713, the Law of Large Numbers states that a large collection
of independent and identically distributed random variables has a sample mean approximately that
of their theoretical mean (16).
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vided any board configuration. Such a method for assessing the quality of any given
move is rather straightforward in that the desired end-state of the game is known:
end on a move in whose reply the opponent’s king is in direct attack and cannot
escape. Capturing this algorithmically is non-trivial, but at least the end-state is
known. Combat simulation is not as well-defined, as each combat scenario may have
different objectives. An additional complication of mirroring AI training techniques
in the simulated combat sphere is the sheer size of the decision space. In chess, the
decision space is moderate, as the number of legal moves is limited within each turn.
However, Shannon demonstrated that at there are roughly 7 × 1014 possible games
within just the first 5 turns (18). The difficulty with simulating chess lies in deciding
which of these games to play to maximize the probability of a win.
In simulated combat, the difficulty lies also in such a decision, although the decision space is much larger. Unhindered by the constraint of an 8 × 8 board, simulated
combat has a decision space at least as large as the number of assets-to-locations
assignments. In modeling a country’s military assets, this lower bound becomes astronomical. Therefore, training algorithms located in AI research and practice are
impractical with current technological constraints. Still, this area of research has
captured a way to assess progress toward a stated goal formatively, which is desired
in combat simulation assessment. In Section 3.1, we incorporate the need for computational efficiency into the decision for an assessment methodology for simulated
warfare. The driving factor in this decision is the decision space’s size.
In the forefront of modern assessment research is serious games – a combination of
education and games as a way to measure student characteristics, rather than solely
their knowledge. Serious games are broadly defined as “digital games created not
with the primary purpose of pure entertainment, but [rather] with the intention of
serious use as in training, education, and health care” (19). Concerning the char-
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acteristics, the multiple-choice-question-type of student assessment fails miserably,
specifically when dealing with assessments of processes, such as in mathematics (20),
“complex problem solving, communication, and reasoning skills” (21). Serious games
have been used to assess levels of systematic thinking, inductive reasoning, creative
design skills, self-esteem, collaboration, interpersonal skills, and aggressiveness (22).
Assessment frameworks for the measurement of a user’s abstract characteristics can
be quite extensive. One such example is in the assessment framework of the game
Elder Scrolls IV: Oblivion (23). In addition to addressing the issue of statistical dependence within a sequence of actions (23, p. 300), the evidence-centered Bayesian
model for assessing a player’s actions is capable of assessing both direct and abstract
goals. Section 3.2 explores this approach for combat simulation. However, combat
assessment could benefit from being able to distill abstract concepts into quantifiable
connections with individual operating environment actions. We consider these ideas
in our value hierarchy in Section 3.1.
A key component of assessment executed within serious games is assessment without the user’s knowledge of being assessed. Stealth assessment – assessments that are
“embedded deeply within games to unobtrusively, accurately, and dynamically measure how players are progressing relative to targeted competencies” (24) – is the focus
of recent research tasked with this exact problem: observation of a process disturbs
the process itself.2 Fortunately, a computational simulation does not encounter the
same difficulty as observation of other processes, since the process being observed is
a programmatic model. A separate module may handle observations to gather the
information, and the simulation may resume afterwards, undisturbed. Nevertheless,
stealth assessment research may be tweaked to apply to combat modeling. First and
2

The central problem with observational studies, sometimes referenced via the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, is the inability to precisely measure quantum particles’ momentum and position
simultaneously. For more information, see (25).
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foremost, this research has tackled the issue of statistical dependence between actions
within a serious game and its consequence on assessment (24). That is, the actions
early on in a game (or in a series of combat actions) impacts the potential actions
later on in the game (or combat sequence). Second, stealth assessment has been
implemented in multiple scenarios to measure different types of learning and learner
attributes within serious games (26). Combat assessment can learn from this research
by utilizing the robust and flexible capabilities of stealth assessment in serious games.
We consider the statistical dependence of actions within the operational environment
as we incorporate multiple combat domains.
In this chapter, we reviewed and commented on assessment contributions outside
of simulated warfare applications. Education assessment delineates between summative and formative assessment, reflecting upon how providing resource gaps as
feedback can be instrumental to success. The GPA framework also naturally points
to the need for a distributional characterization of the operational environment. We
can categorize this distribution in terms of win, loss, and unresolved. Assessment
within chess demonstrated that even an enclosed-space game with scarce components
requires an efficient assessment methodology. Within serious games, we see the benefit of incorporating abstract goals into an assessment methodology, as the simulated
combat application may utilize more ethereal objectives. Lastly, stealth assessment
delved deeper into serious games, revealing the significance of dependent actions as
relates to assessment within a multi-domain combat context. The next chapter synthesizes these lessons learned with the JCS requirements from Chapter I to construct
a value hierarchy capable of evaluating potential methodologies for combat assessment
within simulated war.
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III. Value Hierarchy for Selecting an Assessment
Methodology
In this chapter, we develop a value hierarchy for the evaluation of assessment
methodologies within the simulated combat model context. We develop a set of measurable and specific values for the hierarchy from the characteristics gleaned from
Chapters I and II. We end by providing several candidate assessment methodologies.
In the subsequent chapter, we demonstrate on a small application how these methodologies would function in a simulation of combat. We then utilize the information from
this chapter and Chapter IV to provide a detailed evaluation of the methodologies in
Chapter V and to evaluate our created alternative.

3.1

The Value Hierarchy
In this section, and throughout the rest of this chapter, we utilize the value hi-

erarchy concepts as prescribed by Ralph L. Keeney (27). We start this section by
providing and describing the devised value hierarchy for evaluating simulated combat
assessment methodologies. We then briefly discuss four methodologies to be considered as alternatives for evaluation by our hierarchy. The subsequent chapter presents
the mechanics of each methodology in a small combat simulation before evaluating
the methodologies in Chapter V, which ends by providing a suggested methodology
for use within a campaign-level simulation of combat.
A value hierarchy is an effective tool for quantitatively evaluating partial achievement of criteria. The value hierarchy proposed to evaluate the candidate assessment
frameworks is shown in Figure 2. The strategic objective of the framework is “Maximize the Suitability of the Assessment Framework for a Campaign-Level Combat
Modeling.” The fundamental objectives are to maximize realism, maximize efficiency,
and maximize robusticity. The fundamental objectives are colored green in Figure 2
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and are the first tier under the strategic objective.

Figure 2: Value Hierarchy for Selecting an Assessment Methodology

Several subsequent objectives are important to this hierarchy for connecting the
measurable objectives of the hierarchy to the desired aspects of an assessment methodology within a simulation of warfare.
The Realism portion of the value hierarchy addresses several key components of
a desired methodology: realistically mimic commander and staff decisions, simplify
communication, and completely and accurately assess the operational environment.
An assessment methodology can become more realistic by simplifying communication, maximizing the completeness and accuracy of the assessment methodology, and
by ensuring that the methodology includes all possible operational domains. By simplifying communication, we mean that the structure of the methodology should be
reasonably similar to that of the strategy-to-task framework of Figure 1. An assessment methodology can create this effect by having an integrated alignment of goals
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within the framework, connecting the lowest-level objectives with the highest-level
ones in a similar fashion to the strategy-to-task framework. However, to get to measurable objectives, we break the alignment of goals concept down into the modeling of
relationships and the incorporation of different goal types. Within the relationshipbetween-objectives concept, the assessment framework should model the interdependencies between objectives and imitate the strategy-to-task structure. Within the
JCS framework, objectives will not necessarily be independent. The framework should
therefore capture this aspect of the JCS hierarchy to maximize the accuracy of the
approximation to commander and staff decision processes. Under “Address Different Goal Types,” a combat assessment methodology should also be able to include
both abstract and concrete, or direct, goals. Within the JCS strategy-to-task structure, both types of objectives will be utilized in real decision-making. An assessment
methodology for simulated combat should also be flexible enough to handle multiple
types of objectives to better mimic this decision process.
The second aspect of mimicking commander and staff decision-making is the completeness and accuracy of the assessment provided by a methodology. This objective
can be more technically phrased as the rationality of assessment. Two key aspects
of an assessment methodology’s rationality are whether or not, and to what degree,
it can appropriately assess the operational environment’s contribution to objectives
and whether or not its methodology provides a logistically feasible conceptualization
of the operational environment. The former aspect ensures both completeness and
accuracy by targeting the connection between the operational environment and the
assessment. The latter aspect contributes to the accuracy of the methodology. If the
methodology evaluates based on worst-case or best-case scenarios, then it may overallocate assets to the possible set of combat actions, and therefore assess a combat
posture that is logistically infeasible for that moment in the simulated war.
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The last aspect of realism addresses whether or not the methodology can incorporate multiple combat domains. In order to fully mimic commander and staff decision
processes, the assessment methodology cannot be blind to any part of the operational
environment.
The second fundamental objective in the value hierarchy given in Figure 2 is to
maximize efficiency. Here, we target the desired efficiency of an assessment methodology. The methodology must work efficiently within a modular programmatic environment, as well as be internally efficient. We can increase the efficiency of an
assessment framework via three lines of effort. First of all, limiting assumptions on
the adversary’s allocation limits the amount of data or computation necessary. If only
friendly asset information is required for the assessment, the speed of computation
will increase. Moreover, we can also limit the computational overhead to increase the
assessment methodology implementation’s efficiency. This includes larges quantities
of data as well as long algorithmic processes. These two objectives contribute directly
to technological efficiency. By being more efficient internally as a methodology, its
implementation should mirror this quality.
A combat assessment methodology should also fit well in a modular computational
environment, streamlining the coding structure. The key way for an assessment module to communicate with other modules is by providing feedback to other modules.
This is the cornerstone characteristic of formative assessment. The major role that
combat assessment can play in providing a formative assessment for the simulation
is to analyze and report resource gaps. Here, the framework yields a personalized,
continual report of the potential improvements that the friendly side can make to obtain a more positive assessment result. While addressing these gaps may result in a
heavier computational load, an assessment module improves its efficiency in communicating with other modules by minimizing its output data size. However, providing
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feedback increases the efficacy of assessment and improves the quality of either side’s
allocation.
The last fundamental objective is to maximize robusticity. Robusticity here is a
catch-all for the inclusion technical characteristics. Specifically, we break robusticity into three components: allow for the partial completion of objectives, be capable
of including multiple combat domains, and address objective interactions. A robust
assessment methodology is able to account for and include several niche aspects of
simulated combat. For example, every assessment methodology should correspond
to at least one output – the overall rating. However, when subjected to quantitative
assessment, as we are in this case, we may want to distill the numerical rating into categories. A simple ternary option is win/loss/unresolved. Assessing a certain portion
of the simulation as one of these three labels can ease communication, simplify stopping conditions, and lays the foundation for one way to improve simulation accuracy.
In the education portion of Chapter II, we saw the need to compile multiple outcomes
in an assessment. In combat assessment, this may look like splitting a scenario into
potential futures utilizing slightly different enemy/friendly allocations. Evaluating all
of these potential futures creates a probability distribution of assessment outcomes,
say on a domain of [0,1]. An assessment methodology capable of categorically separating this distribution into the aforementioned ternary can then output a percentage
of the scenario won, lost, and unresolved. By dwindling the unresolved portion, we
can become increasingly accurate in our assessment.
Another facet of robusticity is the equitable application of the assessment methodology to all operational environment domains. While being able to include all domains
is an aspect of realism, an equitable methodology attributes proportional (or otherwise weighted) significance to the domains. For example, it may not be reasonable to
assess the space domain as equal to the ground domain if the size of the space opera-
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tional environment is significantly smaller than that of the ground domain. However,
the quantity of assets may not be the sole indicator of import. No matter the motivating factor, attribution of weights to different objectives allows for an equitable
policy according to stakeholder or analyst input.
The third component of increased robusticity is to account for correlations between
objective achievement. One example of the statistical dependence of achievement to
objectives is a situation where we have the following two objectives: 1) achieve air
superiority, and 2) destroy enemy Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS). Clearly,
destroying enemy IADS is one way that we can achieve air superiority. Achievement
of these two objectives is therefore coupled. An assessment methodology that can
account for these dependencies will improve fidelity.

3.2

Potential Simulated Combat Assessment Methodologies
This section introduces the list of four alternatives to be evaluated through value

hierarchy described above. All assessment methodologies have only two potential
data inputs to consider: the perceived resulting assets from the previous time step’s
combat resolution and the current perceived forces.

3.2.1

Combat Effectiveness and Combat Vulnerability

The following explanation of the Bayesian Enterprise Analysis Model’s (BEAM’s)
current methodology is summarized from the BEAM overview article, Bayesian Analysis of Complex Combat Scenarios (28).
To understand the assessment methodology Combat Effectiveness and Combat
Vulnerability (CE/CV), we first explain some of the mechanics of the simulation and
of the adjudication algorithm. A scenario within BEAM is broken into phases, which
progress linearly in time. Each phase has a set of user-defined goals, which are either
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abstract (e.g. air superiority) or concrete. The simulation progresses discretely, by
a user-defined interval, called a time-step. Each time-step has 16 sets of combat,
called threads. These threads have associated weights summing to unity, as each is
relatively more or less likely to occur than others. This construction adds variability
to the probabilistic outcomes from the adjudication algorithm.
The adjudication algorithm is centered on data, fed from the Joint Wargaming
Analysis Model (JWAM) (28, p. 15). These data help to construct an “extensive
set of Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs)” (28, p. 15), tailored to specific missions and asset types – targeted, defending, and attacking assets. CPTs represent the
stochasticity of adjudication, and function to incorporate multiple concurrent runs
(28, p. 14). An example of a CPT is taken from (28) in Table 1. The outcomes are
the proportion of the targeted asset that remains functional, represented in probability of occurrence. Note that each row of Table 1 sums to 1, since one of the outcomes
must occur. In addition, all columns, save the first and last, sum to an equal probability – 0.6. This is because, “within BEAM, all of the CPT outcomes are represented
as discrete-uniform distributions of specified assets” (28, p. 16), denoted by U(a).
These distributions are not homogeneous, as the width of each bin differs with the
asset and the time-step. For example, one asset may have a discrete-uniform distribution of U(α) = [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25] with bin boundaries bα = [0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7, 1],
while another asset has a discrete-uniform distribution of U(β) = U(α) but with bin
boundaries bβ = [0, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 1].
To integrate asset entities with probabilistic outcomes of the CPTs, BEAM represents assets with their probability distribution in state vectors (28, p. 8). The
interpretation is the remaining capability or resource of the asset from the original
value, given within the continuous interval [0,1]. For example, if a scenario starts off
with 10 F-16s, but this time-step sees only three remaining, then the F-16’s remaining
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Table 1: A Notional Conditional Probability Table (CPT) of targeted enemy assets
distribution based on the ratio of defensive to offensive missions (28, p. 16).
Def:Off
Targeted Asset Quantity Bins
Ratio [0.0] (0,0.2] (0.2,0.5] (0.5,0.6] (0.6,0.9] (0.9,1.0] [1.0]
0:1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1:2
0
0.40
0.28
0.17
0.10
0.05
0
1:1
0
0.16
0.26
0.30
0.19
0.09
0
2:1
0
0.04
0.06
0.13
0.31
0.46
0
1:0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
capability is 0.3. The probability distributions on this interval are discrete-uniform,
with four equal-probability bins. The quartiles are referred to as low, fair, moderate,
and high. Combining friendly and enemy assets in the 16 total combinations of these
quartiles results in the 16 threads per time-step (28, p. 8–9).
BEAM’s adjudication algorithm evaluates each of the 16 threads and “categorizes its outcome into three possible states: (1) one side [has] achieved all of their
phase goals, (2) one side loses the war, or (3) the [combat] is not yet resolved” (28,
p. 22). Threads falling into the first category are stored until the proceeding phase.
Those in the second category are stored until the end of the scenario, as they have
terminated. Threads in the third category proceed into subsequent time steps until
one side’s phase goals have been achieved, or until the proportion of category three
threads is insignificant in comparison to its complement. (Thread proportions are calculated via the product of their respective thread weights). Phase goals are “stated
in terms of achieving one of five states of effectiveness relative to the enemy” (28,
p. 23): Enemy Supremacy, Enemy Superiority, Contested, Friendly Superiority, and
Friendly Supremacy. These regions can be visually demonstrated by two-dimensional
cross sections between intervals in the axes Combat Vulnerability (CV) and Combat
Effectiveness (CE), as shown in Figure 3. Additionally, the user inputs a positive
probability, say ρ, as well as a parameter defining the size of the regions, ∆. Once the
thread achieves the defined probability ρ of being in one of the regions, the thread
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has achieved the phase goal sufficiently. This approach therefore assumes monotonic
movement toward either Friendly Supremacy or Enemy Supremacy after the probability ρ has been surpassed.

Figure 3: Current Assessment Approach within BEAM
Mathematically, CV is the “probability distribution of average losses of friendly
action assets for [a] mission group G” (28, p. 24). Let aA denote an action asset, so
that the CPTs provide the discrete-uniform distribution of these assets after combat,
U(aA ). Then let δaA be the “ratio of the resulting number of assets to the allocated
number of assets” (28, p. 24), which are found in the ranges in the column headers of
each CPT. The body of each CPT contains the probability P r{δaA } of being assigned
to the ratio δaA . To obtain the distribution of CV, we average the asset distributions
across all missions in the mission group G

U(CVG ) =

1 X
U(δaA ∈G )
|G| a ∈G
A

as on page 25 of (28).
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(1)

CE is calculated similarly. We now consider attacking enemy assets, aE ∈ E,
which may be destroyed, and defending friendly assets, aD ∈ F . Now, δaE represents
the ratio of enemy assets destroyed and δaD is the ratio of surviving friendly defensive
assets. Letting G = E ∩ F , we have the distribution of CE as
1
U(CEG ) =
|G|

!
X

U(δaE ∈E ) +

aE ∈E

X

U(δaD ∈F )

(2)

aD ∈F

as on page 25 of (28).
The distributions U(CVG ) and U(CEG ) are given by the probability of being in
each of the following intervals: [0, ∆], (∆, 1 − ∆), and [1 − ∆, 1]. The joint probability
distribution of CE and CV yields probability of being in each region of Figure 3.
Lastly, consider the states Si , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, associated with the regions in Figure
3. Achieving a particular phase goal is defined by meeting or exceeding the threshold
ρ of being in a state Sj , j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, such that j ≥ i and Si is the goal state of
the phase goal. A loss of a phase goal occurs when the probability of being worse
than that phase goal Sj , j < i, meets or exceeds ρ. If any single phase goal is lost,
the thread is considered lost. However, all phase goals must be won in a thread for
the thread to be considered won. Any thread not meeting one of these two criteria is
unresolved (28, p. 26).

3.2.2

Bayesian Networks

A Bayesian Network is a graphical model used “for representing multivariate probability distributions” in a directed acyclic graph, oft exploited for its ability to convey and calculate conditional probabilities. Having unidirectional arcs, a Bayesian
network explicitly defines dependencies; nodes (variables) at the tail of the arc are
dependent upon those at the head of the arc.
To build a Bayesian network by hand, there are a few basic rules. Consider
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random variables A, B, and C. We can position these variables in a directed graph
using various combinations of arcs. Figure 4 shows four foundational examples. In
network 1 of the figure, we have placed no arcs. In this case, all three random variables
are marginally independent of each other. Therefore, the joint distribution is simply
the cross product of the three univariate distributions.

Figure 4: Basic Bayesian Networks and their Associated Joint Distributions
Network 2, however, introduces dependence. In this case, variable A as an influence on variables B and C. B and C are considered the effects of the cause, A. We
consider that B and C are conditionally independent of each other, in the presence
of A; that is, they are dependent only through their conditional dependence upon A.
We can find the joint distribution representing this Bayesian network by crossing the
two conditional distributions with each other and with the distribution of A.
Flipping Network 2 on its head yields Network 3 from Figure 4. In this case, we
have independent causes influencing a single effect. Since C is dependent upon both
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A and B, we cross the conditional distribution f (C|A, B) with the two univariate
distributions of A and B.
The last foundational example is Network 4. Here, the network is based on Markovian principles. The Bayesian network here is similar to considering an entry a1,1 ’s
distribution in a transition matrix after two iterations. With this linear dependence
network, we can find the joint probability distribution defining this Bayesian network
by crossing the conditional distributions of the variables from the right side of the
network to the left.
Shute et. al. (23) explicate the usage of a Bayesian network within an assessment
context. The authors provide a tangible example of dynamic stealth assessment in
immersive games, which they wish to expand to serious games for educational purposes in the future. In their article, the authors focus on the game Elder Scrolls IV:
Oblivion as an adaptive immersive game that could allow for a Bayesian network integrated with individual player data. Specifically, Shute et. al. break down the concept
of “Creative Problem Solving” into a Bayesian network and some notional player data
to instantiate an example of dynamic stealth assessment of abstract attributes. Their
main result is shown in Figure 5.
The joint probability distribution defining the Bayesian network in Figure 5 is
easily deduced from the basic conditional probability rules established above. Let
CP S, P S, C, E, N, OE, and ON stand for CreativeProblemSolving, ProblemSolving,
Creativity, Efficiency, Novelty, ObservedEfficiency, and ObservedNovelty, respectively.
Then the joint distribution defining this Bayesian network is

f (CP S, P S, C, E, N, OE, ON ) =
g(OE|N ) · h(OE|E) · i(N |C) · j(E|P S, C) · k(C|CP S) · l(P S|CP S) · m(CP S)

where each of g, h, i, j, k, l, m are functions defining the corresponding distribution.
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Figure 5: Example Bayesian Network for Assessing a Player’s Creative Problem Solving, from (23, p. 21)
While Figure 5 exemplifies the modeling aspect of a Bayesian network, the conditional probabilities are driven by constructed tables relating data to the model. For
example, if a combat objective to be scored were efficiency, with the end goal as
destroying a navy fleet, then deploying M-1 Abrams tank platoons would likely have
a much lower probability, say 0.05, than would deploying a squadron of F-16 fighter
planes, which may result in a probability upwards of 0.90. Note that these tables
of data are constructed from practical application and/or expert opinion. Although
perhaps initially an arbitrary choice, these task-score assignments may be dynamic
and data-driven within a simulation of combat. Schute et. al. (23) suggest novelty
be quantified via the proportion of other players that have performed the same task,
while quantifying efficiency based on the time elapsed in completing a certain task.
The player’s observed values from 0 to 1 for each of these attributes are provided in
the form of a distribution in the lowest two nodes of Figure 5. In the combat example
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above, if M-1 Abrams tanks historically always fail to defeat a navy fleet, then they
may have an efficiency of 0 for that task.
To apply a Bayesian network to a more concrete top-level node being assessed,
one might imagine certain tasks that could be performed within the combat context
that may contribute, in varying degrees, to the accomplishment of the network’s toplevel objective. For example, if a friendly goal is to destroy an enemy base, then
sending in various types of friendly offensive assets to attack the base may link to
equally-as-various levels of destruction. In addition, sending in defensive assets, or
combinations of offensive assets, may bolster the effectiveness of a single asset type
in accomplishing the task. In this way, conditional relationships based on asset types
could represent the nodes in a Bayesian network for a more concrete objective.
For a more in-depth theoretical understanding of Bayesian networks, the interested
reader is directed to (29).

3.2.3

Value-Focused Thinking: Objectives Hierarchy

All citations in this subsection reference Ralph L. Keeney’s book, Value-Focused
Thinking (27), unless otherwise stated.
An objectives hierarchy (OH) is the main assessment structure from value-focused
thinking (VFT), a subset of decision analysis. However, it typically takes multiple
steps to produce a fully-functional OH. VFT commences with thinking about what is
important within a specific decision context, or problem context (p. 29 – 33). Within
the decision context, one may prefer to see specific outcomes, such as ”maximize
profit.” This is an example of an objective. There are two types of objectives within
an OH: fundamental and means (p. 34). While a “fundamental objective characterizes an essential reason for interest in the decision situation, [...] a means objective is
of interest in the decision context because of its implications for the degree to which
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another (more fundamental) objective can be achieved” (p. 34). We can link these
fundamental and means objectives together in a “means-ends objectives network” (p.
69-70). Objectives reasoned out to be “ends objectives” (p. 66–68) are candidates for
the fundamental objectives. For each fundamental objective, we then build a fundamental objectives hierarchy, which specifies the important aspects of each fundamental
objective (p. 71). From these fundamental objectives, it is often helpful to identify
an overall fundamental objective (p. 77–78). The overall fundamental objective is
the root motivation for the decision context. However, more broadly, an organization
may have general driving objectives, called strategic objectives, which “provide the
foundation for creating alternatives or identifying any decision opportunities based
on values” (p. 207).
In the DoD realm, VFT could be applied at each level of warfare (see Figure
1). However, within each level, a VFT objective could be either a DoD objective or
an effect. For better specificity, a VFT fundamental objective closely corresponds
to a DoD objective, and a VFT means objective closely corresponds to an effect or
task. The overall fundamental objective does not have an explicit DoD counterpart,
although the strategic objective for a decision context mirrors any DoD strategic
objectives applicable to a decision context.
To evaluate alternatives, one must create quantitative attributes. These come
in one of three categories: natural, constructed, and proxy (p. 101–103). Natural
objectives are “those in general use that have a common interpretation to everyone”
(p. 101). Constructed attributes are typically reserved for more abstract objectives,
and may involve subjective – though rigorously defined – numerical indicators for
each level of the attribute (p. 101–102). Lastly, a proxy attribute is used whenever
it is “very difficult to identify either [a natural or constructed] attribute for a given
objective” (p. 103). Therefore, one creates an attribute that indirectly measures the
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Figure 6: From (30), Figure 2, a means-ends objectives network. An arrow indicates
that achieving the former objective influences achieving the latter objective.
objective in question, such as a “natural (direct) measure for a means objective,” so
that the “levels of that attribute are valued only for their perceived relationship to
the achievement of that fundamental objective” (p. 103).
Measurement and weighting of the objectives can be done in many fashions. For
information regarding measurement of the objectives see Keeney (32, p. 27-42), and
for weighting see Keeney (33). The end result of these actions is a (linear) value
function of the form
u(x1 , . . . , xN ) =

N
X

ki ui (xi )

(3)

i=1

where ui , i = 1, . . . , N, is the utility function provided by the measurements of the
individual objectives, ki , i = 1, . . . , N, is the weight on the ith utility function (with
PN
i=1 ki = 1, and xi , i = 1, . . . , N, is alternative X’s impact level for attribute i.
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Figure 7: From (31, p. 9), Figure 4.1, an objectives hierarchy for the Caltrans Project.
The left-hand side provides the strategic objective, which has 3 fundamental objectives in orange. The lowest-level objectives have attributes (in purple), though not
all are pictured.
Equation (3) can be utilized to score a single combat outcome by registering
different characteristics of the simulation in terms of the attributes’ utility functions.
An overall utility value of 0 ≤ u(x1 , . . . , xN ) ≤ 1 is the result, which could be utilized
to determine a distance away from completing all combat objectives.

3.2.4

Linear Program

In this subsection, we describe how a linear program (LP) can be utilized for
the assessment of simulated combat.1 In the previous alternatives, the methodologies provided assessments for the current time-step retroactively; that is, both sides
commit assets (allocation) and then combat is resolved (adjudication) before the simulation conducts assessment of the resolved combat. Optimization requires a different
1

For an introduction to Linear Programming, see (34) or (35)
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perspective, since one cannot optimize the past.
Here, we apply linear programming to evaluate the potential progress of friendly
forces toward combat objectives, in search of an optimal allocation for the next timestep. We demonstrate an array of archetypal objectives and constraints which may
be used in an applied LP to simulated combat. Consider the following sample formulation:
Objective
The following linear program optimizes the combat assessment of a particular
time step in a simulation of war. The decision space is the allocation of assets
to particular missions. The decision variables reflect this. The objective function includes the objectives with relative priorities given by the corresponding
coefficients. Each of the objectives is linearly scaled to be between 0 and 1.
Therefore, the achievement of a specific allocation in terms of an individual objective is provided as a proportion by the value of that decision variable in the
objective function.
Assumptions
We assume that there are finitely many assets and missions, so that the set
of assets-to-missions combinations is also finite, although it may be large. We
assume also that we can approximate fairly well how the enemy will allocate their
assets and to which missions they will allocate these assets, given a particular
friendly allocation. Lastly, we assume that all friendly assets available for the
next time step can be used in any of the possible missions for the next time
step.
Sets
• M - the set of sets of friendly missions available for the next time step
• A - the set of sets of potential friendly assets allocations for the next time
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step
Parameters
The following linear program utilizes the parameters
• a1mj - The number of enemy aircraft flown per enemy sortie given friendly
mission set m ∈ M and asset set j ∈ J
• c1 - The total number of enemy aircraft available for the next time step,
regardless of friendly allocation
• a2mj - The average number of enemy aircraft that can take flight and land
at the runways included in the enemy mission set, given friendly mission
set m ∈ M and asset set j ∈ J, for the next time step
• c2 - The total number of enemy runways available and included in the
enemy’s mission set for the next time step, regardless of friendly allocation
• a3mj - The average amount of fuel required for the enemy’s sorties to be
flown in the next time step, given friendly mission set m ∈ M and asset
set j ∈ J
• a4mj - The total number of enemy sorties to be flown in the next time step,
given friendly mission set m ∈ M and asset set j ∈ J
• c5 - The goal number of enemy sorties which will denote achievement of
total air superiority
• c6 - The maximum possible number of enemy sorties for the next time step.
This is equivalent to max{c1 /a1mj : m ∈ M, j ∈ J}
• a5 - The total number of enemy F-35’s destroyed from the beginning of the
scenario to the end of the most current time step
• a6 - The total amount of enemy fuel in their storage and supply chain at
the beginning of the scenario
32

Decision Variables
The following linear program utilizes the decision variables
• x1 - The level of air superiority achieved
• x2 - The level of the objective destroy 100 F-35s achieved
• x3 - The level of the objective cripple enemy fuel supply achieved
• x4mj - The number of enemy sorties associated with the selection of their
next time step’s mission set
• x5mj - The approximate number of enemy F-35’s to be destroyed in the
next time step, given both friendly and enemy allocations.
• x6mj - The remaining enemy fuel supply (storage plus delivery) available
after applying both friendly and enemy allocations in the next time step
Formulation
Below is the combined formulation for a sample objective function and objectives. The constraints relay how each objective is defined.

max
s.t

w 1 x1 + w 2 x2 + w 3 x3
x4 ≤

(4)

c1mj
a1mj

∀m ∈ M, j ∈ J

(5)

x4 ≤ a2mj c2mj

∀m ∈ M, j ∈ J

(6)

x4 ≤ a3mj a4mj

∀m ∈ M, j ∈ J

(7)

∀m ∈ M, j ∈ J

(8)

x1 ≤ 1 −

x4mj − c5
c6 − c5

x1 ≤ 1
x2 ≤

(9)

a5 + x5mj
100

∀m ∈ M, j ∈ J

x2 ≤ 1
x3 = 1 −

(10)
(11)

x6mj
a6

∀m ∈ M, j ∈ J
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(12)

x1 , x2 , x3 , x4mj , x5mj , x6mj ≥ 0

∀m ∈ M, j ∈ J

(13)

Objective function (4) contains sample weights on the three combat objectives. It is not necessary that these weights be between 0 and 1, nor that they
sum to 1. However, doing so means that the interpretation of the objective function’s value for any allocation is roughly an overall assessment between 0 and 1.
Constraints 5 – 9 represent the first objective, achieve air superiority. We cannot
become logistically infeasible by flying more aircraft than we have (Constraint
(5)), by flying and landing more aircraft than the enemy runways can handle
(Constraint (6)), or by using more fuel than the enemy has available (Constraint
(7)). With the goal of getting enemy sorties below a4 , Constraint (8) yields increasing value for lower quantities of enemy sorties. Pairing this constraint with
Constraint (9), the maximization objective sets x1 = min{1, 1 −

x4 −a4
}.
c4 −a4

Constraints (10) and (11) reference the second objective, destroy 100 F-35’s.
+x5
}.
Equivalent to objective 1, these constraints set x2 = min{1, a5100

Lastly, Constraint (12) records the achievement of depleting enemy fuel. We
subtract from unity since decreasing quantities yield a more desirable result.
This objective does not need a secondary constraint to cap x3 at 1 because x6
is naturally bounded above by a6 and is constrained below in Constraint (13)
by 0.
The above linear program demonstrates a few basic components of applying linear
programming to simulated combat assessment. First of all, in defining the objectives
to be between 0 and 1, and subsequently weighting these objectives in equation 4 such
that the weights sum to unity, we have an objective value that is be easily intelligible
– the objective value for any mission set is the projected scenario-level assessment
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for the next time step. Second, this linear program contains one abstract objective
and two direct, or concrete, objectives. The abstract objective obtain air superiority
is systematically broken down into observable components. These components are by
no means wholly representative or optimal, but rather comprise a unique manner by
which to represent this abstract objective.
The first objective also handles increasing levels of achievement with decreasing
values. Note that a maximum value for the domain of the decision variable is required
(i.e. c4 ). Here, and with the second objective, we demonstrate how to effectually use
multiple constraints to set a decision variable equal to a minimum so that achievement
of an objective is capped when a decision variable reaches a certain value. Lastly, the
third objective is straightforward in its constraints. Here, we demonstrate the simple
application of an objective with decreasing preference.
We end this subsection by noting that the linear programming presented here
is the most basic form of mathematical programming. Dynamic programming, nonlinear programming, and mixed-integer (or integer) programming are variants of linear
programming which may be useful for simulated combat assessment. However, we
present a basic linear programming example and concept to demonstrate the pros
and cons of mathematical programming.
The next chapter introduces a small application problem and individually utilizes
each of the four methodologies presented here to demonstrate their construction in
action. The subsequent chapter amalgamates the information from this chapter and
the next to provide an evaluation of the alternatives in reference to the value hierarchy
in Figure 2.
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IV. Test Application

In this chapter, we demonstrate how the four assessment alternatives could operate
in a simple simulation of combat via a variation of Dresher’s Tactical Air War game
from Berkovitz and Dresher (36). The Combat Effectiveness & Combat Vulnerability method evaluates individual mission areas to determine the current friendly and
enemy abilities to fight back against their adversary. We will demonstrate that the application provides a pessimistic application. Due to its lack of determining an enemy
allocation, the enemy may reuse its forces for each mission. The Bayesian network
approach requires a heavy amount of pre-processed data. We provide notional data,
which could be generated by either expert opinion or historical/simulation data. This
approach predicts an expected assessment for the next time-step based on the conditional probabilities between enemy and friendly force allocations. We then present
the Value-Focused Thinking Objectives Hierarchy, which closely mirrors the JCS’s
strategy-to-task framework. This methodology utilizes an additive model based on
the achievement of individual campaign objectives. Lastly, we present a linear program for Dresher’s game. This alternative optimizes the next-step’s assessment in
terms of notional objectives, utilizing all logistically friendly and enemy allocations
as inputs.
Before presenting examples of each alternative’s application, we first distill the
game to a point where each assessment methodology can evaluate a hypothetical allocation and either recommend a next allocation of friendly assets and/or comment
on potential friendly achievement for the next time-step. We utilize this demonstration in the evaluation of the four alternatives and our created alternative in Chapter
V.
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4.1

Dresher’s Game
Dresher’s Tactical Air War Game consists of a series of maneuvers (a strike)

between two opposing forces - Blue and Red. The original game assumes each side to
have a fixed number of two generic types of aircraft to allocate to missions: bomber
and fighter. We label these initial quantities of these aircraft B, F, β, and φ for
friendly bombers and fighters, and enemy bombers and fighters, respectively.
While the bomber type can be used in “either counter-air or ground support roles,”
the fighter type can be used “in the air defense or ground support roles” (36, p. 1).
Friendly bombers can attack either enemy bomber fields or enemy fighter fields as
part of the counter-air role (36, p. 2), while friendly fighters can prevent either enemy
bombers or fighters from reaching their targets (36, p. 3). Berkovitz and Dresher
assume that each side knows their own and the opponent’s fleet size, but does not
know how the opponent will allocate their bombers and fighters until after a strike
is completed (36, p. 3). They also assume that enemy losses due to “accidents and
ground defenses are small,” and should be considered negligible, as should any planes
lost in air defense and ground support roles (36, p. 5).
In combat adjudication, several additional values are important. Enemy fighters
allocated to air defense will reduce friendly bombers allocated to counter-air missions.
Since the enemy does not know the friendly force’s allocation, enemy fighters do
not distinguish between friendly bombers attacking enemy fighter bases and those
attacking enemy bomber bases (36, p. 4). Let x be the number of Blue bombers
allocated to counter-air missions, and let µ be the number of Red fighters allocated
to air defense missions. Also let c be a constant defining the air defense potential,
or the effectiveness of Blue air defense aircraft. Then the number of Blue bombers
reaching Red air bases is x − cµ, unless cµ > x, in which case no Blue bombers reach
their destination (36, p. 4). When Blue bombers reach Red airfields, we assume that
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each bomber can destroy b1 Red bombers and b2 Red fighters. Any Blue bombers
that fail to penetrate Red defenses are not destroyed, but instead return to base (36,
p. 5). For Red, we let ξ, e, d1 , and d2 be analogous to x, c, b1 , and b2 , respectively, and
let u be the Blue equivalent to Red’s µ.
The objective of Dresher’s game is to support ground operations (36, p. 6). Note
that the objective support ground operations is abstract, and therefore must be interpreted. For Dresher and Berkovitz, the value of the objective is

M=

N
X

[(Bi + Fi − xi − ui ) − (βi + φi − ξi − µi )]

(14)

i=1

where i indicates the strike number. The interpretation of Equation (14) is that the
payoff for Blue, M , is equal to the sum of all strike’s payoffs to Blue. One strike’s
payoff is the difference between Blue and Red ground support sorties, which are
given by the first and second set of parenthetical terms of Equation (14). Note that
an assessment methodology can make implicit assumptions. Equation (14) assumes
that “bombers and fighters are equally effective in the ground support role” (36, p. 6).
Dresher and Berkovitz’s assessment methodology is only one possible method for
quantifying success in this simple simulation of combat. Even given the same abstract
objective support ground operations, other methodologies may define a distinct assessment relationship with the operational environment. For example, the VFT and LP
alternatives would break down this objective into sub-objectives, which may or may
not produce an equivalent value to M . In any case, the assessment methodologies
we present provide an accrued benefit after each time step, given that this combat
simulation is sequential. At the end of each time step, both Red and Blue have a
new number of bombers and fighters available for the next time step’s allocation.
The original game terminates after a “predetermined number of strikes” (36, p. 6),
defined as N .
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For all assessment methodologies, some aspects of combat remain equal. The
Dresher game assumes that assistance to friendly ground forces “can be measured by
the difference between [friendly] ground support sorties and [enemy] ground support
sorties” (36, p. 6). Note that this assumes equal efficacy of the bombers and fighters.
In the original game, the payoff, or benefit, to friendly forces is the sum of these
scores across all strikes (36, p. 7). We have now provided sufficient baseline detail of
the game to demonstrate how to incorporate the four assessment methodologies. A
summary of the structure of attack is provided in Figure 8. Some of the variables in
this figure have been introduced. The remaining will be introduced in the adjudication
below.

Figure 8: Dresher’s Game Objectives Hierarchy
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4.1.1

Dresher’s Game 1st Time-Step Adjudication

Now that we have introduced the basic rules and definitions for Dresher’s Game,
consider the following initialization for our adjudication. In the following four sections, assume that Blue starts with fB,1 = 10 fighters and bB,1 = 13 bombers, while
Red starts with fR,1 = 10 fighters and bR,1 = 15 bombers. Adjudication for the
CE/CV methodology will use BEAM’s method. For all other methodologies, let the
two air defense potentials be c = e = 0.5, and let b1 = d1 = 1 and b2 = d2 = 2. Of
note, Blue has 11 ∗ 11 = 121 ways to allocate its force in the first time step, while Red
has 14 ∗ 9 = 126 ways to allocate its force in the first time step. There are therefore
15, 246 possible allocations for the first time step. Taking a cue from Dresher and
Berkovitz’s analysis of optimal allocations, assume that Blue allocates all bombers to
counter-air – Sbb,B,1 = 1 bomber to attack Red fighter bases, Sbf,B,1 = 12 bombers to
attack Red bomber bases – and allocates all Sf,B,1 = 10 fighters to air defense missions. Assume analogously that Red allocates all bombers to counter-air – Sbb,R,1 = 1
bomber to attack Blue fighter bases, Sbf,R,1 = 14 bombers to attack Blue bomber
bases – and all Sf,R,1 = 10 fighters to air defense (36, p. 10 – 15).
We now adjudicate the outcome from the above allocation. While Blue allocates
13 bombers to attack red bases, Red allocates its 10 fighters to air defense. Since
e = 0.5, only 5 of the bombers are stopped from reaching their destination. There are

13
= 1287 combinations of Blue’s bombers that the Red fighters can stop. 495 of
5
these combinations include the one bomber attacking a Red fighter base. Therefore,
let a random draw between [0,0.385] denote that Red has stopped Blue’s bomber from
attacking a Red fighter base. Similarly, let a random draw in (0.385,1] denote that
this bomber has not been stopped. Our random draw is 0.110, and so this bomber
returns to Blue’s bomber bases. Additionally, four Blue bombers attacking Red’s
bomber bases return to Blue’s bomber bases.
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Before adjudicating further, we must know how many Red fighters are returned
to their bases. While Red allocates its 15 bombers to attack Blue bases, Blue deploys
its 10 fighters to air defense. Again, since c = 0.5, only 5 of the bombers are stopped

from reaching their destination. There are then 15
= 3003 different ways that the
5
Red bombers reach Blue’s bases. In 1001 of these, the Red bomber attacking the
Blue fighter base does not reach its destination. So, we let a random draw between
[0,0.333] denote that Blue has stopped Red’s bomber from attacking a Blue fighter
base. Similarly, let a random draw in (0.333,1] denote that this bomber has not been
stopped. Our random draw is 0.960, and so this bomber successfully reaches the Blue
fighter base. Additionally, five Blue bombers attacking Red’s bomber bases return to
Blue’s bomber bases.
Because there are

13
10



= 286 adjudication outcomes for this interaction, we choose

one randomly. Since 220 of these combinations have in them the Blue bomber attacking a Red fighter base, we let a random draw in [0,0.770] denote that Red has
stopped this bomber. Similarly, a random draw in (0.770, 1] denotes that Red has
not stopped this bomber. A random draw with a random seed produced 0.965, and
so we determine that Red does not stop the bomber attacking one of its fighter bases.
Instead, it stops 10 of the 12 bombers attacking its bomber bases.
During the attack, we assume that the bombers return to their respective bases
before the opponent’s bombers reach those bomber bases. For Blue and Red, five
bombers each are located at their side’s bases. As a result of combat, Red destroys
up to two Blue fighters and up to nine Blue bombers. Blue destroys up to eight
of Red’s bombers. At the end of this time step, Red has bR,2 = 10 bombers and
fR,2 = 10 fighters, and Blue has bB,2 = 8 bombers and fB,2 = 8 fighters.
In the following four sections, we apply each of the assessment methodologies to
a single time-step of combat to illustrate their interaction with a simulated combat
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Table 2: Initialization and First Time-Step Parameters for Dresher’s Game Applications
Definition Parameter Value
Blue Air Defense Potential
c
0.5
e
0.5
Red Air Defense Potential
Blue Bomber-Bomber Potency
b1
1
d1
1
Red Bomber-Bomber Potency
Blue Bomber-Fighter Potency
b2
2
d2
2
Red Bomber-Fighter Potency
Initial Blue Bombers
bB,1
13
Initial Red Bombers
bR,1
15
fB,1
10
Initial Blue Fighters
Initial Red Fighters
fR,1
10
nd
2 Time-Step Blue Bombers
bB,2
8
nd
2 Time-Step Red Bombers
bR,2
10
2nd Time-Step Blue Fighters
fB,2
8
nd
fR,2
10
2 Time-Step Red Fighters
Blue Bombers Attacking
Red Bombers - 1st Time-Step
Sbb,B,1
12
Blue Bombers Attacking
Red Fighters - 1st Time-Step
Sbf,B,1
1
Blue Fighters Defending
Red Bombers - 1st Time-Step
Sf,B,1
10
Red Bombers Attacking
Blue Bombers - 1st Time-Step
Sbb,R,1
14
Red Bombers Attacking
Blue Fighters - 1st Time-Step
Sbf,R,1
1
Red Fighters Defending
Blue Bombers - 1st Time-Step
Sf,R,1
10
context. Throughout the methodologies, we reference the parameter values in table
2.

4.2

Combat Effectiveness/Combat Vulnerability in Dresher’s Game
For the CE/CV assessment methodology, the overall objective is predetermined

– maximize combat effectiveness. In this application, we break up the first time-step
into 4 threads, rather than the 16 in BEAM. Although we only perform one time-
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step, we set the probability threshold ρ = 0.70 for resulting in either a win or loss, or
remaining unresolved. However, we will let ∆ = 0.25 define the size of the 5 states:
Enemy Supremacy, Enemy Superiority, Contested, Friendly Superiority, and Friendly
Supremacy.
For this alternative, we use BEAM’s adjudication, rather than that of Dresher’s
game, so that the cross of CE and CV can provide a joint distribution. As this
is the initial time-step, we only have one thread (28, p.

14). The allocation was

previously given, so that we have three missions per side within a singular mission
group. The first two are offensive: friendly bombers attack bomber bases and fighter
bases. The conditional probability tables (CPTs) for these respective missions are in
Tables 3 and 4. The defensive mission is the fighters defending attacking bombers,
which has a corresponding CPT in Table 5. For simplicity, we assume that the CPTs
are equivalent from each side’s perspective.
Table 3: CPT for Enemy Bombers Defending Against Friendly Bombers in a Friendly
Offensive Mission
Def:Off
Targeted Asset Quantity Bins
Ratio [0.0] (0, 0.2] (0.2,0.5] (0.5,0.6] (0.6,0.9] (0.9,1.0] [1.0]
0:1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1:2
0
0.42
0.29
0.14
0.09
0.06
0
1:1
0
0.12
0.21
0.31
0.22
0.14
0
2:1
0
0.06
0.1
0.15
0.29
0.4
0
1:0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

Table 4: CPT for Enemy Fighters Defending Against Friendly Bombers in a Friendly
Offensive Mission
Def:Off
Targeted Asset Quantity Bins
Ratio [0.0] (0.0,0.25] (0.25,0.4] (0.4,0.6] (0.6,0.85] (0.85,1.0] [1.0]
0:1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1:2
0
0.45
0.3
0.12
0.1
0.03
0
1:1
0
0.13
0.22
0.35
0.28
0.02
0
2:1
0
0.02
0.08
0.13
0.22
0.55
0
1:0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
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Table 5: CPT for Enemy Bombers Defending Against Friendly Fighters in a Friendly
Defensive Mission
Def:Off
Targeted Asset Quantity Bins
Ratio [0.0] (0.0,0.2] (0.2,0.5] (0.5,0.7] (0.7,0.8] (0.8,1.0] [1.0]
0:1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1:2
0
0.51
0.23
0.13
0.08
0.05
0
1:1
0
0.06
0.29
0.36
0.22
0.07
0
2:1
0
0.03
0.08
0.11
0.3
0.48
0
1:0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Since Blue attacks Red’s fighters with just one bomber, we have a defense-offense
ratio of 10:1, which is closest in ratio to 1:0. However, there are still bombers attacking, which cannot be neglected. So, we round up to the ratio 2:1, and so Red fighters
end the time-step with a health distribution of [0.02, 0.08, 0.13, 0.22, 0.55] over the bins
[0, 0.25, 0.4, 0.6, 0.85, 1]. Also, Blue attacks Red’s bombers with a ratio of 15:12, which
is closest to the ratio of 1:1. The resulting Red bombers will then have a health dis14
)[0.12, 0.21, 0.31, 0.22, 0.14] over the bins [0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.6, 0.9, 1]. Lastly,
tribution of ( 15

Blue fighters defend against Red bombers with a ratio of 1:10, which we again round
up to 1:2. So, Red bombers in this mission end the time-step with a health distri1
bution of ( 15
)[0.03, 0.08, 0.11, 0.3, 0.48] over the bins [0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 1]. Similarly,

Blue’s fighters defending against Red bombers in a Red offensive mission of ratio 2:1
leaves Blue’s fighters with a health distribution of [0.02, 0.08, 0.13, 0.22, 0.55] over the
bins [0, 0.25, 0.4, 0.6, 0.85, 1]. Since we assume equivalent CPTs from both sides, the
Red bomber attack on Blue bombers results in a Blue bomber health distribution
12
of ( 13
)[0.12, 0.21, 0.31, 0.22, 0.14] over the bins [0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.6, 0.9, 1]. In addition, the

Blue bombers attacking Red fighters end the time-step with a health distribution
1
of ( 13
)[0.03, 0.08, 0.11, 0.3, 0.48] over the bins [0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 1]. These results are

summarized in Table 6.
We now aggregate the two missions for each side’s bombers. For the Red bombers,
the two distributions sum to approximately [0.114, 0.201, 0.293, 0.072, 0.088, 0.084,
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Table 6: Red-Blue Def:Off Ratio and Resulting Health Distributions
Action
Blue Atk Red F
Blue Atk Red B
Blue Def Red B
Red Atk Blue F
Red Atk Blue B
Red Def Blue B

Actual
Off:Def Ratio
10:1
15:12
1:10
10:1
14:13
1:10

Rounded
Def:Off Ratio
2:1
1:1
1:2
2:1
1:1
1:2

Asset
Red F
Red B
Red B
Blue F
Blue B
Blue B

Health Distribution
[0.02, 0.08, 0.13, 0.22, 0.55]
14/15[0.12, 0.21, 0.31, 0.22, 0.14]
1/15[0.03, 0.08, 0.11, 0.3, 0.48]
[0.02, 0.08, 0.13, 0.22, 0.55]
12/13[0.12, 0.21, 0.31, 0.22, 0.14]
1/13[0.03, 0.08, 0.11, 0.3, 0.48]

Bins
[0, 0.25, 0.4, 0.6, 0.85, 1]
[0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.6, 0.9, 1]
[0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 1]
[0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.6, 0.9, 1]
[0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.6, 0.9, 1]
[0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 1]

Table 7: Discrete-Uniform Quartile Bins for Red and Blue Assets
Distribution Bins
Asset
Blue Bombers [0, 0.405, 0.564, 0.782, 1]
Blue Fighters [0, 0.623, 0.864, 0.932, 1]
Red Bombers [0, 0.403, 0.563, 0.779, 1]
Red Fighters [0, 0.623, 0.864, 0.932, 1]
0.147] over the bins [0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1]. The Blue bombers’ distributions
sum to approximately [ 0.113, 0.200, 0.290, 0.072, 0.091, 0.086, 0.148] over the bins [0,
0.2, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1]. The discrete-uniform distribution of the Red bombers
has the bins [0, 0.403, 0.563, 0.779, 1], while the discrete-uniform distribution of the
Blue bombers has the bins [0, 0.405, 0.564, 0.782, 1]. Meanwhile, both Blue and
Red fighters have the same discrete-uniform distribution, given by the bins [0, 0.623,
0.864, 0.932, 1]. These results are summarized in Table 7.
We now calculate the CV and CE for each of the Blue and Red perspectives. We
first sum the two Blue discrete-uniform distributions to receive U(CVB ), which has
bin boundaries [0, 0.461, 0.677, 0.889]. The Red discrete-uniform distributions sum
to yield U(CVR ), which has similar bin boundaries [0, 0.460, 0.677, 0.889].
To calculate CE, we first calculate the discrete-uniform distribution for Blue’s
offensive CE, which is equivalent to Red’s CV distribution. Next, we calculate Blue’s
defensive CE, which is calculated by taking the complement of its defensive assets’
health distribution and then placing it in four equal-probability bins. The result is
the discrete-uniform distribution U(CEB ), which is defined by the bin boundaries
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[0.111, 0.464, 0.707, 1]. We analogously calculate Red’s CE, which has a resultant
discrete-uniform distribution U(CER ) defined by the bin boundaries [0, 0.114, 0.489,
0.779, 1].
Table 8: CE × CV States at End of First Time-Step
Blue
Combat Vulnerability (CV)
[0, 0.25]
(0.25, 0.75)
[0.75, 1]
[0.75, 1]
Friendly
Friendly
Contested S3
Combat
Supremacy S5 Superiority S4
0.001
0.092
0.12
Effectiveness (0.25, 0.75) Contested S3
Contested S3
Enemy
(CE)
Superiority S2
0.003
0.189
0.247
[0, 0.25]
Contested S3
Contested S3
Enemy
Supremacy S1
0.002
0.15
0.196
Red
Combat Vulnerability (CV)
[0, 0.25]
(0.25, 0.75)
[0.75, 1]
[0.75, 1]
Friendly
Friendly
Contested S3
Combat
Supremacy S5 Superiority S4
0.002
0.121
0.159
Effectiveness (0.25, 0.75) Contested S3
Contested S3
Enemy
(CE)
Superiority S2
0.003
0.161
0.212
[0, 0.25]
Contested S3
Contested S3
Enemy
Supremacy S1
0.003
0.146
0.192
The cross between Blue’s CE and CV and the cross between Red’s CE and CV
are provided in table 8. If we assume that the scenario started in a contested state,
S3 , then neither side has won nor lost this scenario. We can see this by summing the
probabilities associated with states S3 , S4 , S5 – 0.557 for Blue and 0.595 for Red –
and by summing the probabilities associated with states S1 , S2 – 0.443 for Blue and
0.404 for Red. Since none of these summations is larger than ρ = 0.70, the scenario
remains unresolved.
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4.3

Bayesian Networks in Dresher’s Game
In this section, we demonstrate the application of Bayesian networks in Dresher’s

Game by building the network and data tables manually. We first define an objective function, comprised of three notional objectives, which will be pertinent to the
BN, VFT, and LP methodologies. We then utilize the conditional probability rules
established in Section 3.2.2 in order to construct the joint probability distribution of
the Bayesian network for each side’s assessment. We utilize the state-space and each
vector’s associated probability for next time-step’s allocation to obtain an expected
objected value for each side. We consider this expected value to be the assessment
gleaned from this methodology.
Suppose we have three objectives that we would like to utilize for our objective
function: (1) minimize cost, (2) minimize enemy capability, and (3) maximize friendly
capability. A simple way of tracking a cost objective is in total cost, which makes
future actions dependent upon current actions. Suppose that flying a friendly bomber
to attack enemy bombers costs Cbb = $290, 000, that flying a friendly bomber against
enemy fighters costs Cbf = $240, 000, and that flying a friendly fighter to defend
against enemy bombers costs Cf = $110, 000. The total friendly cost through next
time-step can then be represented as the numerator in
Cbb Sbb,B,i + Cbf Sbf,B,i + Cf Sf,B,i + P Ci
Cbb bB,i + Cf fB,i + P Ci

(15)

where P Ci is the previous cumulative cost of the friendly missions flown during the
scenario. Note that the denominator is the maximum cumulative spending that can
occur during the next time step. In our case, we exclude the term Cbf bB,2 since
Cbf < Cbb . Equation (15) is a standardized value for the cost objective on the domain
[0,1]. In order to obtain the cost objective value for Blue during the ith time-step,
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we need only to subtract Equation (15) from unity, as we wish to minimize the cost.
Red’s cost objective function is analogous to subtracting Equation (15) from unity,
as well.
For the capability objectives, we can create a points system in order to weight
the destruction of friendly or enemy assets – Pb = 3 points for destroying bombers
and Pf = 2 points for destroying fighters. This weighting is a notional “relative
importance,” which here means that bombers are 1.5 times as important as fighters.
In application, these weights could be generated using subject matter expert opinion
or by running multiple simulations to understand the relative importance of an asset
to completing combat goals. Within this points system, we want to know the number
of points destroyed (for enemy forces) and the number of points remaining (for friendly
forces). To do this for the next time-step’s combat, we have to invoke the adjudication
portion of combat. We can do this in the objective itself. Note that the number of
Red bombers remaining at the beginning of time-step (i + 1) is

bR,i − b1 (Sbb,B,i − min{Sbb,B,i , eSf,R,i })

where e = 0.5 and b1 = 1 are as defined at the beginning of this chapter. Adding in
the weighted points system for capability, the enemy capability objective from Blue’s
perspective is then

1−

1
[Pb (bR,i − b1 (Sbb,B,i − min{Sbb,B,i , eSf,R,i }))
Pb bR,1 + Pf fR,1
+Pf (fR,i − b2 (Sbf,B,i − min{Sbf,B,i , eSf,R,i }))]
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(16)

and the friendly capability objective from Blue’s perspective is
1
[Pb (bB,i − d1 (Sbb,R,i − min{Sbb,R,i , cSf,B,i }))
Pb bB,1 + Pf fB,1
+Pf (fB,i − d2 (Sbf,R,i − min{Sbf,R,i , eSf,B,i }))]

(17)

where c = e = 0.5, b1 = d1 = 1, and b2 = d2 = 2 are as defined at the beginning of this
chapter. Both objectives have once again been standardized, so that the maximum
number of points is the amount that each side starts with at the beginning of the
scenario. In equation 16, we subtract from unity because we wish to define increasing
progress toward minimizing the enemy’s capability as closer to one.
With our objectives defined in Equations (15) – (17) to all range over [0,1], we
may wish to define an overall objective value which also ranges over [0,1]. Since
P
we have three objectives, constraining these weights w1 , w2 , w3 to 3i=1 wi = 1 will
accomplish the task. For simplicity, let wi = 31 , i = 1, 2, 3. The overall objective is the
inner product of these weights and the three objectives’ values. This overall objective
is the associated assessment with a particular allocation.
With the objectives defined, we proceed to the Bayesian network for Dresher’s
game. The network is defined by the following decision variables: Sbb,B,i , Sbf,B,i ,
Sf,B,i , Sbb,R,i , Sbf,R,i , and Sf,R,i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N , where i corresponds to the timesteps. While the structure of the network remains constant for each time-step, the
CPTs may change relating these decision variables from one time-step to the next.
We know up front that the number of bombers attacking bombers or fighters are
interdependent. We can arbitrarily choose to have Sbb,B,i be an independent cause for
Sbf,B,i , and similarly for Red.
From Blue’s perspective, we assume that Red’s choices are the causes and Blue’s
choices are the effects. Since fighters defend against bombers, we assume that Blue
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bomber choices are dependent upon Red’s fighter choice, and also that Blue’s fighter
choice is dependent upon Red’s bomber choices. Red’s perspective is analogous,
maintaining symmetry between the two side’s assessments. With these dependencies
in mind, we can construct the Bayesian networks as given in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Dresher’s Game Bayesian Network
From each side’s perspective, we have two marginally independent networks. The
joint probability distribution that defines each side’s perspective is the product of
these two networks. From Blue’s perspective, we have
−−→
P (SB,i ) =P (Sbb,B,i , Sbf,B,i , Sf,B,i , Sbb,R,i , Sbf,R,i , Sf,R,i )
= [P (Sbf,B,i |Sbb,B,i , Sf,R,i ) · P (Sbb,B,i |Sf,R,i ) · P (Sf,R,i )] ·
[P (Sf,B,i |Sbb,R,i , Sbf,R,i ) · P (Sbf,R,i |Sbb,R,i ) · P (Sbb,R,i )]
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(18)

and from Red’s perspective,
−−→
P (SR,i ) =P (Sbb,R,i , Sbf,R,i , Sf,R,i , Sbb,B,i , Sbf,B,i , Sf,B,i )
= [P (Sf,R,i |Sbb,B,i , Sbf,R,i ) · P (Sbf,B,i |Sbb,B,i ) · P (Sbb,B,i )] ·
[P (Sbf,R,i |Sbb,R,i , Sf,B,i ) · P (Sbb,R,i |Sf,B,i ) · P (Sf,B,i )]

(19)

Now, assume that we have just ended the first time step’s adjudication according
to the scenario defined at the beginning of this chapter. The networks in Figure 9
may be interpreted as defining “the probability of the allocation of Blue and Enemy
forces, based on historical data.” After calculating the probability of a certain state
vector, we determine the expected value of next time-step’s assessment.
We now build notional conditional probability tables with some desired properties.
First, the number of Blue bombers and Red bombers allocated to missions must be less
than or equal to the total number of available bombers, bB,i and bR,i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
So, the ordered pair (Sbb,B,2 , Sbf,B,2 ) = (5, 6), for example, must have an associated
probability of 0, since bB,2 = 10. Several of the probability distributions are bi-modal,
as well. This is because we assume it advantageous to allocate either all or none of
the aircraft in a category to a single mission. This assumption is supported by the
majority of optimal decisions provided by Dresher and Berkovitz (36, p. 12).
The conditional probability tables are provided in Appendix A. Note that the
state-space of the Blue Bayesian network’s joint distribution has 534,600 state vectors,
and Red’s joint distribution has 556,600 elements. To obtain these distributions, one
needs only to cross the data in the Appendix A tables according to Equations (18)
and (19).
−−→
−−→
To reach an overall assessment we can take the probabilities P (SB,i ) and P (SR,i )
and multiply them by their associated overall objective values. Summing over the
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products yields an expected value, or expected assessment value for the next timestep. When we perform these calculations using the data in Appendix A, we obtain
a Blue assessment of about 0.31 and a Red assessment of about 0.25. We can take
from the CE/CV approach and set our threshold value ρ = 0.7 to be the necessary
assessment score of either the friendly or enemy objectives to declare a win/loss/unresolved. Since neither side has an assessment exceeding this value, doing so would
mean that the thread remains unresolved.

4.4

Value-Focused Thinking in Dresher’s Game
In this section, we continue to utilize the original allocation and adjudication re-

sults from Table 2. We also utilize the objectives from the Bayesian network methodology presented in Section 4.3 to construct the objectives hierarchy and the attributes
used to score the alternative in terms of the lowest-level objectives. In difference to
the Bayesian network methodology, however, we assess the current time-step’s adjudication, rather than projecting one time-step into the future.
We have already three means objectives: minimize cost, maximize friendly capability, and minimize enemy capability. We now build an OH that envelops these
objectives. Consider that Dresher’s Game occurs at the tactical level. From figure
1, this is the lowest level of warfare considered in the strategy-to-task framework.
Therefore, a reasonable strategic objective could be “support operational-level strategic goals,” which are outside the scope of Dresher’s Game. Directed more toward
tactical-level operations, the overall fundamental objective could be to “win the scenario efficiently.” As it is meant to be very broad, we need to specify what “winning”
means and what “efficiency” means. These two subcategories can be translated into
fundamental objectives as “destroy enemy forces” and “preserve friendly forces at low
cost.” Our means objectives fit nicely under these fundamental objectives. “Minimize
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enemy capability” is a means objective for the “destroy enemy forces” fundamental
objective and both ”minimize cost” and ”maximize friendly capability” are means
objectives for the “preserve friendly forces at low cost” fundamental objective. While
minimizing cost is an observable means objective, we must specify further the other
two means objectives. We can observe the two capability means objectives by observing the number of remaining friendly and enemy bombers and fighters. This
completes our objectives hierarchy. Figure 10 contains a graphical representation of
the hierarchy.

Figure 10: Dresher’s Game Objectives Hierarchy
We now construct the attributes for the lowest-level objectives. Again, let Cbb =
$290, 000 be the cost of flying a friendly bomber to attack enemy bombers, Cbf =
$240, 000 the cost of flying a friendly bomber against enemy fighters, Cf = $110, 000
the cost of flying a friendly fighter to defend against enemy bombers, bB,i be the num53

ber of friendly bombers available for the ith time-step’s allocation, fB,i the number of
friendly fighters available for the ith time-step’s allocation, P Ci the previous cumulative cost of the friendly missions flown during the scenario, Pb = 3 the number of
points for destroying bombers, and Pf = 2 the number of points for destroying fighters. Again, let bR,1 , fR,1 , bB,1 , fB,1 be the number of Red bombers and fighters and
Blue bombers and fighters, respectively, available at the beginning of the scenario.
The attributes for the enemy capability objective from Blue’s perspective at the
end of time-step 1 are ECBB,1 and ECFB,1 , for bomber and fighter destruction,
respectively, which are defined as
bR,2
bR,1
fR,2
=1−
fR,1

ECBB,1 = 1 −

(20)

ECFB,1

(21)

Similarly, the friendly capability objectives from Blue’s perspective at the end of timestep 1 are F CBB,1 and F CFB,1 , for remaining bombers and fighters, respectively,
which are defined as
bB,2
bB,1
fB,2
=
fB,1

F CBB,1 =

(22)

F CFB,1

(23)

Lastly, the cost objective from Blue’s perspective at the end of time-step 1 is CB,1 ,
which is defined as

CB,1 = 1 −

Cbb Sbb,B,1 + Cbf Sbf,B,1 + Cf Sf,B,1 + P C0
Cbb bB,1 + Cf fB,1 + P C0

(24)

although the previous cost, P C0 , is 0.
The Red-perspective objectives hierarchy is the same as provided in figure 10.
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In addition, the Red-perspective objectives can be found by analogue to the Blueperspective objectives in Equations (20) – (24).
Different from the Bayesian network methodology, we now have five weights – one
for each of the lowest-level objectives. However, to maintain some uniformity, let
wECB = wF CB =

2
,
15

wF CF = wECF =

1
5

and wC = 13 . This allows us to keep nearly

the same ratio that we integrated via the points system into the Bayesian network
methodology. We also may define utility functions for each of these attributes that
determine the amount of utility returned for specific attribute achievement levels.
For example, the achievement of objectives in the Bayesian network methodology
was strictly linear, and so an increase of from 0.1 to 0.2 in the friendly capability
objective would result in an increase of utility from 0.1 to 0.2. Consider the cost
objective. We know that the value of this objective is a ratio of the cumulative cost
to the maximum possible cumulative cost. Therefore, during each successive timestep, it will become increasingly more difficult to get a lower value for this objective.
We can offset this property by utilizing an exponential utility function for the cost
objective, namely

UC (CB,1 ) =

1 − e−CB,1 /0.410
1 − e−1/0.410

(25)

which has the property that UC (0.75) = 0.5.
The remaining utility functions are as follows:

UECB (x) = x

UECF (x) = x

UF CB (x) = x

UF CF (x) = x

all of which are defined on x ∈ [0, 1], and where x is an objective value returned from
one of the objectives equations. The overall utility function (and assessment value)
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for Blue’s first time-step is

UB,1 =

2
[UECB (ECBB,1 ) + UF CB (F CBB,1 )]
15
1
1
+ [UECF (ECFB.1 ) + UF CF (F CFB,1 )] + UC (CB,1 )
5
3

(26)

and Red’s overall utility function for its first time-step is the same, with its corresponding analogous inputs.
Inputting the adjudication and initialization parameters from table 2 yields a Blue
assessment of about 0.31 and a Red assessment of about 0.38. Since neither value is
above the ρ = 0.7 threshold, the current scenario remains unresolved.

4.5

Linear Program in Dresher’s Game
In this section, we continue to utilize the original allocation, as well as the orig-

inal adjudication methods. However, before continuing with the operational environment, we need to establish the linear program. The below formulation captures
a multi-objective linear program and demonstrates some intermediate if-then constraints which could appear in some contexts. In the LP, we use “friendly-enemy”
terminology, rather than the previous “Blue-Red.” We do this to demonstrate the
interchangeability of the LP from each side’s perspective.
To apply linear programming, we can look at optimization over the next time
step. Consider the following sample formulation:
Objective
The following linear program (LP) optimizes the combat assessment of the
second time-step in the Dresher game outlined in the introduction to this
chapter. There are three objectives: minimize cost, minimize enemy capability, and maximize friendly capability. The first of these is direct, while
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the latter two objectives require some interpretation. Our interpretation is
provided below. Each of the objectives is scaled to have a value between 0
and 1. We then apply weights to the individual objective values to provide
the relative importance of the objectives and to provide an overall objective value between 0 and 1. As the interpretation of the objective value
is most naturally interpreted with increasing preference, we introduce a
maximization LP with objective values subtracted from unity.
Assumptions
There are two key assumptions in this LP, beyond those of general logistics
feasibility. First, we assume that the adjudication rules outlined in the
introduction to this chapter remain valid throughout all time-steps. This
allows us to optimize over the next time-step. Second, we assume that
the enemy utilizes the same assessment method, objectives, and weights.
We utilize this symmetry to calculate the enemy’s optimal response to a
friendly allocation. This requires pre-processing and storage of the optimal
enemy allocation in a table to feed the linear program. The result is that
we can make the enemy allocation a set of parameters that get fed in via
this table to correspond with friendly allocation. We can then adjudicate
the projected combat defined by friendly and enemy allocations and assess
the completion of friendly objectives by our LP. In order to reduce the
number of subscripts used, we assume that an allocation is referenced by
a single index.
Sets
We use a singular set as a collection of indices referencing the enemy
allocations:
• J – The set of indices assumed to be contained in the data set con-
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taining optimal enemy responses to friendly allocations, which reference individual allocations of attacking bombers to fighters, attacking
bombers to bombers, and defending fighters
Parameters
The linear program utilizes the following parameters
• w1 , w2 , w3 – The weights on objectives 1, 2, and 3, respectively
• bf r,i – The number of friendly bombers at the start of the ith timestep, i = 1, 2, . . . , N
• ben,i – The number of enemy bombers at the start of the ith time-step,
i = 1, 2, . . . , N
• ff r,i – The number of friendly fighters at the start of the ith time-step,
i = 1, 2, . . . , N
• fen,i – The number of enemy fighters at the start of the ith time-step,
i = 1, 2, . . . , N
• c/e – The air defense potential of Blue/Red fighters, which dictates the effectiveness of both friendly and enemy fighters at blocking
bombers from reaching their target(s)
• b1 /b2 /d1 /d2 – The number of aircraft that Blue/Red destroys upon
successful attack of Red/Blue aircraft
• P Ci – The cumulative previous cost, from the beginning of the scenario through the current time-step, of friendly sorties
• Cbb – The cost of flying a single friendly bomber on a mission to
attack enemy bombers
• Cbf – The cost of flying a single friendly bomber on a mission to
attack enemy fighters
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• Cf – The cost of flying a single friendly fighter on a mission to defend
against enemy bombers
• Pb – The number of “points” gained by destroying an enemy bomber
• Pf – The number of “points” gained by destroying an enemy fighter
• [abb,en,i ]j – The number of enemy bombers targeting friendly bombers
in the enemy’s j th allocation in the ith time step, i = 1, 2, . . . , N
• [abf,en,i ]j – The number of enemy bombers targeting friendly fighters
in the enemy’s j th allocation in the ith time step, i = 1, 2, . . . , N
• [af,en,i ]j – The number of enemy bombers defending against friendly
bombers in the enemy’s j th allocation in the ith time step, i =
1, 2, . . . , N
The initial values of these parameters are provided in table 9. Note
that initial values such as Pf and Cbf are designed to keep the trade-off
space interesting and do not reflect real-world values.
Decision Variables
The linear program utilizes the following decision variables
• [Sbb,f r,i ]j – The number of friendly bomber sorties to fly next timestep to attack enemy bombers, given the enemy’s j th allocation, i =
1, 2, . . . , N
• [Sbf,f r,i ]j – The number of friendly bomber sorties to fly next timestep to attack enemy fighters, i = 1, 2, . . . , N
• [Sf,f r,i ]j – The number of friendly fighter sorties to fly next time-step
to defend against enemy bombers, i = 1, 2, . . . , N
• x1,j , x2,j , y1,j , y2,j – Proxy decision variables to determine how many
enemy fighters will affect friendly bombers and how many enemy
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Table 9: Initialization Parameters for Dresher’s Game Application of the LP Methodology – After the 1st Time-Step’s Adjudication
Parameter Initialized Value Parameter Initialized Value
w1
1/3
w2
1/3
w3
1/3
bf r,1
13
15
ff r,1
10
ben,1
10
bf r,2
8
fen,1
ben,2
10
ff r,2
8
10
c
0.5
fen,2
e
0.5
b1
1
1
b2
2
d1
d2
2
P C1
$4, 820, 000
$290, 000
Cbf
$240, 000
Cbb
Cf
$110, 000
Pb
3
2
Pf
bombers will be affected by friendly fighters, given the enemy’s j th
allocation
• z1,j , z2,j , z3,j , z4,j , z5,j , z6,j , z7,j , z8,j – Binary decision variables to form
if-then constraints, given the enemy’s j th allocation
Formulation
Below is the symbolic formulation for this LP. Although there may be
different values for our time-step-indexed variables, we solve for a particular i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }. We provide the general formulation here, but
will solve for i = 2. After explication, we provide a solution to the LP,
which is equivalent to the assessment of this first time-step utilizing the
LP methodology.



Cbb [Sbb,f r,i ]j + Cbf [Sbf,f r,i ]j + Cf [Sf,f r,i ]j + P Ci
max
w1 1 −
Cbb bf r,i + Cf ff r,i + P Ci


Pb (ben,i − b1 ([Sbb,f r,i ]j − x1,j )) + Pf (fen,i − b2 ([Sbf,f r,i ]j − x2,j ))
+ w2 1 −
Pb ben,1 + Pf fen,1


Pb (bf r,i − d1 ([Sbb,en,i ]j − y1,j )) + Pf (ff r,i − d2 ([Sbf,en,i ]j − y2,j ))
+ w3
Pb bf r,1 + Pf ff r,1
(27)
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s.t

[Sbb,f r,i ]j + [Sbf,f r,i ]j ≤ bf r

∀j ∈ J (28)

[Sf,f r,i ]j ≤ ff r,i

∀j ∈ J (29)

x1,j ≤ [Sbb,f r,i ]j

∀j ∈ J (30)

x1,j ≤ e[af,en,i ]j

∀j ∈ J (31)

x2,j ≤ [Sbf,f r,i ]j

∀j ∈ J (32)

x2,j ≤ e[af,en,i ]j

∀j ∈ J (33)

y1,j ≤ [abb,en,i ]j

∀j ∈ J (34)

y1,j ≤ c[Sf,f r,i ]j

∀j ∈ J (35)

y2,j ≤ [abf,en,i ]j

∀j ∈ J (36)

y2,j ≤ c[Sf,f r,i ]j

∀j ∈ J (37)

e[af,en,i ]j − [Sbb,f r,i ]j ≥ −(efen,i + bf r,i )z1,j

∀j ∈ J (38)

x1,j − [Sbb,f r,i ]j ≥ −(efen,i + bf r,i )(1 − z1,j )

∀j ∈ J (39)

[Sbb,f r,i ]j − e[af,en,i ]j ≥ −(efen,i + bf r,i )z2,j

∀j ∈ J (40)

x1,j − e[af,en,i ]j ≥ −(efen,i + bf r,i )(1 − z2,j )

∀j ∈ J (41)

e[af,en,i ]j − [Sbf,f r,i ]j ≥ −(efen,i + bf r,i )z3,j

∀j ∈ J (42)

x2,j − [Sbf,f r,i ]j ≥ −(efen,i + bf r,i )(1 − z3,j )

∀j ∈ J (43)

[Sbf,f r,i ]j − e[af,en,i ]j ≥ −(efen,i + bf r,i )z4,j

∀j ∈ J (44)

x2,j − e[af,en,i ]j ≥ −(efen,i + bf r,i )(1 − z4,j )

∀j ∈ J (45)

c[Sf,f r,i ]j − [abb,en,i ]j ≥ −(cff r,i + ben,i )z5,j

∀j ∈ J (46)

y1,j − [abb,en,i ]j ≥ −(cff r,i + ben,i )(1 − z5,j )

∀j ∈ J (47)

[abb,en,i ]j − c[Sf,f r,i ]j ≥ −(cff r,i + ben,i )z6,j

∀j ∈ J (48)

y1,j − c[Sf,f r,i ]j ≥ −(cff r,i + ben,i )(1 − z6,j )

∀j ∈ J (49)

c[Sf,f r,i ]j − [abf,en,i ]j ≥ −(cff r,i + ben,i )z7,j

∀j ∈ J (50)
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y1,j − [abf,en,i ]j ≥ −(cff r,i + ben,i )(1 − z7,j )

∀j ∈ J (51)

[abf,en,i ]j − c[Sf,f r,i ]j ≥ −(cff r,i + ben,i )z8,j

∀j ∈ J (52)

y1,j − c[Sf,f r,i ]j ≥ −(cff r,i + ben,i )(1 − z8,j )

∀j ∈ J (53)

k = 1, 2, 3, 4,∀j ∈ J (54)

z2k−1,j + z2k,j = 1
[Sbb,f r,i ]j , [Sbf,f r,i ]j , [Sf,f r,i ]j ∈ Z + ∪ {0}

∀j ∈ J (55)

x1,j , x2,j , y1,j , y1,j ≥ 0

∀j ∈ J (56)

z1,j , z2,j , z3,j , z4,j , z5,j , z6,j , z7,j , z8,j ∈ {0, 1}

∀j ∈ J (57)

The objective function (27) is broken into three components. The first
of these fractions defines the minimize cost objective. After the adjudication portion of any time-step, that time-step’s sorties have been paid
for. Therefore, the cost referred to is that of the next time-step. The
total cumulative cost of past and the next time-step is therefore the cost
of each planned sortie for the next time-step plus the previous cost. To
standardize that value, we divide by the maximum possible cumulative
cost at the end of the next time-step. Here, we assume Cbb ≥ Cf , since it
is true for our particular case. Therefore, the maximum possible cumulative expenditure for the end of the next time-step is the more expensive of
the two bomber sorties multiplied by all available bombers plus the cost
of flying all available fighters, plus the previous cost of the sorties during
this scenario. Note that a reduced cost produces a higher cost objective
value, which is desirable for this maximization problem.
The second fraction of the objective function defines the minimize enemy capability objective. The numerator is comprised of two portions: the
weighted points of the remaining enemy bombers after the friendly allocation, and the weighted points of the remaining enemy fighters after the
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friendly allocation. The proxy decision variables x1 and x2 are constrained
such that x1 = min{Sbd,f r,i , cSf,en,i } and x2 = min{Sbf,f r,i , cSf,en,i }. Such
constraints ensure the adjudication rules of the game. eSf,en,i will effectively block friendly bombers, after which, the remaining bombers will
destroy b1 bombers and b2 fighters. Note that a reduced enemy force produces a higher enemy capability objective value, which is desirable for this
maximization problem.
The third portion of the objective function is analogous to the second portion, but instead focuses on remaining friendly forces. We do not
subtract from unity for this objective because we wish to maximize it.
The constraints are constructed in groups. Constraints (28) and (29)
limit friendly allocations to the number of respective friendly bombers and
fighters at the beginning of the next time-step.
Constraints 38 – 54 set the values for x1,j , x2,j , y1,j , and y2,j by using
four sets of two if-then constraint sets. For example, constraints 38 and 39
create the logical constraint (e[af,en,i ]j ≥ [Sbb,f r,i ]j ) ⇒ (x1,j ≥ [Sbb,f r,i ]j ).
Similarly, Constraints 40 and 41 create the logical constraint ([Sbb,f r,i ]j ≥
e[af,en,i ]j ) ⇒ (x1,j ≥ e[af,en,i ]j ). Coupled with Constraints (30) and (31),
these 6 constraints set x1,j = min{[Sbb,f r,i ]j , e[af,en,i ]j }, as desired. These
constraints are repeated for x2,j , y1,j , and y2,j alongside constraints (30) –
(37).

LP Solution
When creating the LP in a general programming language (e.g. R, Python), we can
load the enemy optimal allocation data in and loop through each friendly allocation
to find the friendly optimal allocation to the enemy allocation parameters. By storing
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these values, we can then take the highest value and find the corresponding friendly
allocation. If using a mathematical programming language (e.g. GAMS, Lingo), we
can create sets in our data and then solve for the optimal friendly objective all at
once.
The optimal Blue allocation is [[Sbb,f r,2 ]j , [Sbf,f r,2 ]j , [Sf,f r,2 ]j ] = [0, 8, 8], which has
a corresponding Red allocation of [0, 10, 10]. The optimal objective value for this
set of allocations is about 0.52. For Red, the optimal allocation is [0, 10, 10] with
a corresponding Blue optimal allocation of [0, 8, 8]. It is a show of LP construction
validation that these optimal allocations match. This allocation provides Red with
an optimal objective value of about 0.65. Note that the objective values are not
complements of each other in this case, since the cost objective is not complementary
when considering each side’s perspective.
We can glean from the approach of the CE/CV alternative and set our threshold
value ρ = 0.7 to be the necessary assessment score of either the friendly or enemy
objectives to declare a win/loss/unresolved. Since neither side has an assessment
exceeding this value, the thread remains unresolved.
In this chapter, we presented Dresher’s Game as a small combat simulation in order
to demonstrate the details of our four assessment methodologies for combat simulation. We applied the Combat Effectiveness & Combat Vulnerability, Bayesian Network, Value-Focused Thinking, and Linear Programming alternatives to Dresher’s,
which will aid in their evaluation in the next chapter. Chapter V provides a detailed
discussion of these methodologies in terms of the value hierarchy from Chapter III.
Chapter V ends in applying value-focused thinking concepts to create a new alternative with a better overall evaluation than the four methodologies presented in this
chapter.
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V. Evaluation of Potential Methodologies Using the Value
Hierarchy

In this chapter, we provide a full evaluation of the alternatives utilizing the nine
lowest-level objectives of the value hierarchy defined in Section 3.1. We include comments from the illustration of these methodologies in Dresher’s Game from Sections
4.2 – 4.5. After the explication of the alternative’s evaluations, we create a new alternative from the highest-evaluated methodologies. A summary of the evaluations
is provided in Table 10.
Table 10: Evaluation of Alternatives - Categorical Labels
Alternatives
CE / CV
Bayesian Network
VFT
LP

Simplistic
Fair
Good
Fair
Good

Alternatives
CE / CV
Bayesian Network
VFT
LP

Assumptions
Good
Poor
Good
Good

Alternatives
CE / CV
Bayesian Network
VFT
LP

Win/Loss
Good
Good
Good
Good

5.1

Realism
Complete and Accurate
Comprehensive
Fair
Good
Excellent
Good
Good
Good
Excellent
Good
Efficiency
Computation
Modular
Poor
Poor
Poor/Inf.
Excellent
Fair
Poor
Fair
Excellent
Robusticity
Equitable Across Domains Correlations btwn Objectives
Good
Poor
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good
Fair

Realism
For the simplistic objective: the CE/CV alternative scores “Fair.” Although the

end state of this methodology is fairly simplistic – one of five categories – the division
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of each time step into 16 threads and the use of joint probability distributions elevated
the complexity of this approach. Internal reporting of the time step’s probability distribution into the five categories does simplify its interaction with other modules.
Despite commanders having a generally basic understanding of probability concepts,
the CE/CV methodology incorporates multiple sources of variation and further complexifies communication of this alternative. However, because the joint distribution
is easily distilled into a graphic, we evaluate the alternative as “Fair” for this objective. This aligns with the evaluation according to the lowest-level objectives under
the simplistic objective. The hierarchical structure of the JCS doctrine is imitated
between the phase goals, which influence the resolution of the time-step’s threads into
one of the five categories. Secondly, the CE/CV approach does not explicitly model
interdependencies between objectives (phase goals). In addition, this methodology
does not incorporate abstract objectives into its phase goals, but rather is itself an
abstract objective. The objective clearly is to obtain friendly superiority, which is
broken out into completion of the phase goals. For this reason, the CE/CV approach
receives a “Fair” for this objective.
Bayesian networks are fairly simplistic to communicate, although hard to establish
in some circumstances. To communicate the methodology to a decision-maker, one
needs only to provide that the Bayesian network is built on the dependencies occurring
in the operational environment. These relationships inform the overall probability distribution for our allocation. However, the data that build the network are subjective,
either based on expert opinion or historical data. When questioned about why the
assessment methodology produces specific outcomes, communication quickly turns
technical. For this reason, we expect a “Good” evaluation for this objective. Because
of the ease of explanation, we expect a good evaluation from this objective via the
lowest-level objectives. Clearly, this methodology is meant to model interdependen-
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cies between objectives. By putting the network in tiers that flow upward, one can
easily conform a Bayesian Network into a hierarchical structure resembling that of
the JCS doctrine. Direct goals are easily measurable, but so, too, are abstract goals.
By building a network that translates actions into probability distributions, abstract
goals are naturally measurable within this methodology. However, details regarding
the network’s CPTs are not easily explained. So, while the network structure may
be intuitive, the distributions may not be. For this reason, the Bayesian Network
methodology receives a “Good” for this objective.
The VFT alternative is also fairly simple to communicate to leadership. This approach aligns most with the JCS doctrine, establishing a tiered assessment that could
at times mirror the exact structure from Figure 1. However, its simplicity is slightly
under that of Bayesian Networks. Consider that to incorporate objectives dependencies, the VFT would need interaction terms in the objectives, which often do not have
natural interpretations. These terms are not conditional probabilities, as contained
in the BN alternative, and so explaining the assessment methodology for a particular scenario can easily be clouded with these terms. We see the simplicity of this
methodology match up with the evaluation of the lowest-level objectives of our value
hierarchy from Chapter III. Due to its more rigid structure, we cannot directly model
interdependencies between objectives. However, both abstract and direct goals are
easily incorporated. Abstract goals are typically measured via constructed attributes,
but may also be broken up into lower-level direct objectives. When included, constructed attributes could lead to confusing incorporation into a programmatic model.
Alternatives are typically given subjective scores for constructed attributes. Applying
abstract objectives to a computerized simulation could therefore lead to a disconnect
in communication between the objectives and the implementation. Overall, the VFT
methodology does well in some of the lowest-level objectives and poorly in others for
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the simplistic objective, and so receives a “Fair.”
The linear program approach, while not mathematically simple, has a streamlined interpretation. In Section 4.5, we demonstrated an optimization of our objectives over all possible friendly allocations. When questioned about the objectives,
the LP naturally directs the audience to the assumptions that inform the constraints.
Communicating these assumptions leads to direct and top-level discussion regarding
the validity of this assessment methodology. We do not see such an open avenue of
communication with the assumptions in the CE/CV and BN methodologies. Conditional probabilities in the CE/CV and BN approaches force communication about
assumptions into the lower levels of technical detail. While we believe that leadership
would understand the LP approach, the approach does not naturally translate into
the JCS strategy-to-task hierarchy. Comprised of a series of objectives, it would be
possible to visualize the objectives with their associated constraints as sub-objectives,
but the mechanism of assessment is nothing close to a hierarchy. However, the interdependencies between the objectives is well modeled, as these interactions exist
implicitly within the dual problem to the LP. Lastly, this methodology can incorporate both abstract and direct goals, as previously demonstrated. Altogether, because
the mechanism by which the approach assesses the operational environment differs so
distinctly from that of the JCS doctrine, this alternative receives a “Good” for this
objective, rather than an “Excellent.”
Moving on to the second Realism objective – complete and accurate – the CE/CV
approach performs moderately. We expect this result from the CE/CV approach because of the worst-case-scenario approach used at the mission level of the calculation.
By assuming that each enemy allocation to friendly missions can access all of their
available assets, the overall assessment is performed on a logistically infeasible set of
mission-level allocations. For this lowest-level objective, the alternative scores “Poor.”
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However, the methodology appropriately assesses the operational environments contribution to phase goals using its joint distribution and categorization mechanisms.
Despite the over-allocation of assets to missions, the operational environment is represented as being in one of five states in relationship to friendly/enemy phase goals.
We see this relationship as an appropriate alternative for assessing the contribution of
the operational environment. Therefore, the CE/CV approach receives a “Good” for
this lowest-level objective. Combining the scores for the two lowest-level objectives
yields an overall score of “Fair” for the completeness and accuracy objective.
Bayesian networks score “Excellent” for the complete and accurate objective. We
expect this due to how Bayesian networks function. In utilizing evidence from the
operational environment to construct and reinforce the network, the end result spans
the operational environment (completeness) and corresponds well with the evidence
provided (accuracy). Looking at the lowest-level objectives, the BN alternative is
logistically feasible. Because the BN methodology only deals in past progress for
the end of a time-step, the methodology is as logistically feasible as the simulated
combat scenario. Assuming the rest of the model is adequately valid, the BN methodology is logistically feasible. Furthermore, by drawing directly from the actions taken
within the operational environment, the BN methodology accurately connects the
operational environment to the network, and therefore to the objectives. For these
reasons, the BN receives an “Excellent” for this objective.
The Value-Focused Thinking alternative scores “Good” for the complete and accurate objective. The VFT is wholly dependent upon the actions taken in the operational environment, as it comments only on past performance. However, in measuring abstract goals, it is possible that the use of constructed attributes may lead
to a slightly inappropriate assessment of the operational environment’s contribution
to the combat goals. The VFT scores a “Fair/Good” for this lowest-level objec-
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tive. The VFT also scores a “Good” for the lowest-level objective logistically feasible.
Upon combining the scores of these two lowest-level objectives, the alternative scores
“Good” for this objective.
The Linear Program approach also does not have any issues with feasibility. In
fact, it optimizes over an overall allocation to a set of missions, and therefore is
constrained by logistics. The LP also appropriately assesses the contribution of the
operational environment to combat goals as constructed by the constraints. The
feasible region allows for partial completion in multiple objectives simultaneously, as
seen in the other three alternatives. For these reasons, the LP alternative receives an
“Excellent” for the complete and accurate objective.
The last of the Realism objectives addresses comprehensiveness across all combat
domains. At this time, there is no reason to believe that any of the alternatives
would not be able to accommodate input from any of the domains. For the CE/CV,
VFT, and LP alternatives, adding one or more domains is a matter of recording the
(projected) adjudication results from the operational environment. Meanwhile, the
BN methodology simply incorporates more data into the mission-level details input
as evidence into the network. For these reasons, each of the alternatives receives a
“Good” for this objective.

5.2

Efficiency
Moving on to the first of the Efficiency objectives – assumptions – we evaluate the

CE/CV alternative as “Good.” While the lack of assumptions on enemy allocation
makes the methodology logistically infeasible in many cases, this aspect of the CE/CV
alternative increases its efficiency.
The Bayesian network, while not assuming a particular enemy allocation, requires
data detailing enemy allocation (conditional) probabilities. The excess computation

70

generated by requiring these inputs is inefficient, and may result in an excessively large
joint distribution state-space. Storing these data may become intractable. Therefore,
the BN alternative scores a “Poor” for this objective.
Section 4.4 illustrated that the VFT alternative depends on the enemy allocation
insomuch that the user defines an enemy-incorporating objective. For example, no
knowledge of the enemy’s allocation is necessary for the minimize friendly cost objective (equation 24), but is required for the two capability objectives (equations 20
– 23). However, even when these data are required the enemy allocation is deterministically known. Hence, assumptions do not significantly decrease the methodology’s
efficiency. For this reason, the alternative scores a “Good” for this objective.
The Linear Program relies heavily upon the projection of enemy allocation, but
does not make any outright assumptions. In Section 4.5, we assumed that the enemy
allocation was optimized using the same objectives as the friendly assessment. However, this was only done in the absence of an adjudication algorithm to calculate the
corresponding enemy allocation. In an operational combat simulation, the LP would
calculate the enemy’s allocation using an adjudication algorithm. We discuss this
in reference to the next objective. Because the LP does not make any assumptions
regarding the enemy’s allocation, we evaluate it at a “Good” for this objective.
The second of the Efficiency objectives is computational overhead. In Section 4.2,
we presented the methodology as applied to a singular thread. The assessment calculations are mirrored for each of the 16 threads when the simulation is past the initial
time-step. Consequently, the CE/CV approach utilizes a lot of extra computation
while referencing CPTs, re-binning asset distributions, calculating the CE/CV joint
distribution to categorize the threads, and aggregating the threads to obtain a final
assessment. We score this methodology at a “Poor” for this objective.
The Bayesian Network methodology also requires a lot of computational over-
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head, in the form of data collection and network mapping. In order to form the BN
for Dresher’s Game in Section 4.4, we manually created the CPTs, which required
ensuring consistency across the conditional and unconditional distributions for each
variable. We required data for each node and relationship in the network. When
considering many missions and assets within those missions, and operational combat
simulation would require a much more extensive network with many more CPTs.
There exist algorithms that can automate both network construction and conditional
probability tables (37; 38; 39). However, these options require a bit of additional
computational overhead. Coding these algorithms often requires time fine-tuning
scoring parameters to judge the viability of the constructed network (39; 40), some
level of subject matter expertise implicit in the application of the algorithm (41), or
post-hoc evaluation of the Bayesian Network’s accuracy/effectiveness (42). In any
case, the state-space of the joint probability distribution of an allocation can become
intractably large. In the Bayesian network presented in Section 4.3, each side’s joint
probability distribution had more than 500, 000 elements in its state space. When we
extend the number of assets types and increase the number of available assets of a
single type, this methodology could become infeasible to implement. The Bayesian
Network methodology therefore scores “Poor/Inf.” (for Poor/Infeasible) in the computational overhead objective, conditional upon the size of the simulation.
The VFT methodology requires minimal computational overhead. As it is an
additive model, there is little computation required once the module calculates the
individual objective values. Calculating the objective values may require some extra
computation if the utility functions for some of the objectives become complex. However, all data utilized is deterministically known. Much more of the computational
overhead for this alternative comes in the creation of the hierarchy and the definition
of the attributes and their utility functions. This alternative scores a “Good” for the
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computational overhead objective, because it is extremely efficient once initialized.
Applying a linear program to the assessment of simulated combat requires significant computational overhead. On top of initializing the LP with its objectives,
variables, and constraints, the methodology also requires one run of the adjudication algorithm for every friendly allocation evaluated. Although the Simplex Method
is an exponential-time algorithm in the worst case (34, p. 393), there are efficient
polynomial-time algorithms which quicken the LP solution time, such as Karmarkar’s
algorithm and Khachian’s algorithm (34, p. 401–414). Because this methodology is
dependent upon the efficiency of these allocation and adjudication algorithms, we
assume that these are constructed to be computationally efficient. The result is a
computationally semi-efficient algorithm that requires some preliminary work in its
initialization. The Linear Program alternative therefore scores a “Fair” for the computational overhead objective.
The last of the Efficiency objectives addresses their modularity. The CE/CV
approach has already been implemented in a modular environment. The CE/CV
approach provides feedback in the form of in which of the five states each objective
ends the time-step. Objectives with an end state closer to Enemy Superiority should
receive more attention. However, specific asset resource gaps are not addressed in its
BEAM application. For this reason, the alternative scores “Poor” for the modularity
objective.
The Bayesian network methodology may address resource gaps by comparing the
overall objective values between scenarios. Doing so would require more computation,
but the distribution structure of the network provides a robust basis for addressing
resource gaps. One way to observe resource gaps is to analyze scenarios’ objective values with their decision variable’s distributions. Doing so internally to an assessment
algorithm would be computationally intensive, but would provide valuable informa-
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tion regarding which assets should be more heavily focused or invested in. Because
of the extreme potential to provide formative assessment, this methodology receives
an “Excellent” for this objective.
The VFT alternative addresses resource gaps in the same way as the CE/CV
alternative. While the assessment algorithm may seek out individual objectives which
are providing low utility, the alternative does not address specific asset weaknesses or
strengths driving these utility levels. For this reason, the VFT methodology scores
“Poor” for this objective.
Lastly, applying an LP to the assessment of simulated combat requires that the
adjudication and allocation portions of the model be modularized, so that they can be
called by the LP. As a module, the LP assessment would be in frequent communication
with this (these) other module(s). The LP also naturally addresses resource gaps via
shadow prices. The logistic feasibility constraints on the allocation of assets are those
from which we can best utilize the shadow prices. The interpretation of the shadow
price in this context is “the additional progress toward our combat objectives which
may be gained by increasing the available number of asset a by one.” If the constraint
it binding at the optimal solution, then we will get a non-zero shadow price. For a
maximization LP, we would want to focus more on the assets whose corresponding
constraints have larger absolute shadow prices. A largely negative shadow price means
that we should devalue the corresponding asset, and the opposite for a largely positive
shadow price. Because of the vast opportunity for formative assessment with linear
programming, this alternative receives an “Excellent” for this objective.

5.3

Robusticity
We now address the last of the three branches in our value hierarchy – Robusticity.

The first sub-objective for this branch is titled Win/Loss, short for the objective
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to categorize the probabilities of multi-thread outcomes into one of Win, Loss, or
Unresolved. As previously described, the CE/CV methodology incorporates such a
categorization, and so receives a “Good” for this objective.
We demonstrated in Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 that we can use the threshold
probability ρ from the CE/CV methodology to categorize the assessment for the BN,
VFT, and LP methodologies, as well. The categories for each assessment methodology
can be categorized from the friendly perspective by: (1) unresolved if both friendly
and enemy assessment scores are between [0, ρ), (2) won if the friendly assessment
is between [ρ, 1] and enemy assessment is between [0, ρ), and (3) lost if the friendly
assessment is between [0, ρ) and enemy assessment is between [ρ, 1]. Hence, these
three objectives also score “Good” for this objective.
The second sub-objective under Robusticity is Equitable across Domains. As currently presented, each methodology can place weights on the domains to ensure that
the combat results from each domain provide proportional value to their portion of
the operational environment. If desired, the analyst may use alternative means of
weighting, such as weighting according to the amount of change caused in a specific domain. In all cases, the alternatives are capable of being equitable across each
combat domain, and therefore receive a “Good” for this objective.
The last objective is Correlations Between Objectives. An important aspect of
assessment is accurately representing achievement. Whenever achievement in one
objective is tied to achievement in another objective, it is important that changes in
the operational environment not receive double credit or double penalty.
The CE/CV alternative weakly incorporates this idea. The application of CE/CV
in Section 4.2 demonstrated the methodology for a single mission group. BEAM applies the methodology to multiple mission groups. For those groups ending in the unresolved category at the end of a time-step, BEAM aggregates each asset’s remaining
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outcome distributions. These distributions are weighted by their associated thread’s
weight. Being weighted by their associated thread and the relative health of each
mission group’s asset distribution, we receive an aggregated asset distribution which
considers these relative weights (28, p. 27). Note that these weights are not weights
on objectives, nor are any relationships between the mission groups themselves considered. Therefore, the CE/CV alternative receives a “Poor” for this objective.
The Bayesian network presented in Section 4.3 does not incorporate the objectives
explicitly. Rather, the probabilities generated from the network are utilized alongside
an allocation’s corresponding objective value to calculate an expected objective value.
However, dependencies between the objectives could be incorporated by feeding this
decision variable network into a separate objectives Bayesian network. A separate
network is required so that the defining joint distribution of the decision variables
excludes the objectives’ state-space. Rather, the joint distributions of the decision
variables’ BNs would determine the univariate cause nodes of the objectives’ BNs.
Further CPTs between the objectives would then create a joint distribution of the
objectives’ values, from which an expected value is simply calculated. In sum, the
BN alternative is capable of correlating the objectives, although doing so requires
additional computation effort. Therefore, the alternative scores a “Good” for this
objective.
The VFT alternative may include some objectives correlations. In fact, Keeney
conditions the validity of the additive value/utility model on attribute independence
(27, p. 133–138). In order to obtain this independence from otherwise dependent
attributes, we may add a joint-objective term may be added to the hierarchy, defined
as the interaction of two or more objectives. This is distinct from the interaction of
decision variables. Similar to an interaction term in regression methods, this jointobjective term would output a utility equal to the achievement caused by the simul-
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taneous effects of multiple objectives. This term may not be easily intelligible, nor
easily defined. Also, one could replace the incorporated single-objective terms in the
model with the joint-objective term, so as to not double-count contributions to the
overall assessment. Similar to regression, the utility function of this joint-objective
term would be dependent upon the different levels of achievement in each variable.
One way to accomplish this is to perform function composition. For example, let
x1 and x2 be two objectives and y the utility value for the x1 ∗ x2 objective. Suppose g1 (x1 ), g2 (x2 ) are utility functions for x1 , x2 , respectively. Then we could let
y = h1 (g2 (x2 )) or y = h2 (g1 (x1 )), where h1 (·), h2 (·) are defined functions for the interaction dependent upon an x2 or x1 input, respectively. Note that this approach is
dependent upon knowing a theoretical correlation between the two objectives x1 , x2 in
order to construct the functions h1 (·), h2 (·). Alternately, one could utilize data on the
interaction between differing levels of achievement in the original objectives in order
to construct an interaction term. Similar to the BN approach, incorporating multiobjective consequences into the assessment requires extra computational load. This
approach scores a “Good” for this objective. However, doing so would significantly
increase the amount of computational overhead for this objective, thereby changing
this alternative’s computational overhead evaluation to “Fair.” As we wish for each
methodology to provide as much formative assessment feedback as possible, this is a
desirable trade-off.
The LP alternative implicitly considers correlations between the objectives in
the form of objective trade-offs. From duality theory, we know that if the primal
problem contains an optimal solution, then so, too, does the dual problem, and the
objective values of these problems are equal (34, p. 266). If we define our objectives
well, then each objective will have a maximum value of 1 and a minimum value of 0.
Therefore, as long as we establish the constraints such that there is at least one feasible
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solution, then both the primal and dual problems will have an optimal solution.
The LP assessment methodology considers objective trade-offs in the implicit dual
problem, whose constraints’ right-hand sides are the objective function coefficients.
As the primal problem works through various allocations, the dual problem performs
objective trade-offs. Therefore, any influence that one objective has on another will
be implicitly considered within each iteration. However, this concept is different from
observing correlations between objectives, because only the boundaries of the dual
constraints are considered. Because of this disparity, the LP alternative receives a
“Fair” for this objective.

5.4

Methodology Creation and Finalization
In this section we compare the four methodologies’ evaluations. We then create a

new alternative from the best methodologies as determined from our nine objectives.
Table 11 provides the distribution of evaluations summarizing the previous three
sections and Table 10. Presented this way, we can see that the VFT and LP alternatives have the least “Inf.” or “Poor” evaluations. In addition, the CE/CV alternative
has more “Fair” evaluations than any other alternative and has the least number of
“Good” evaluations. We therefore consider the CE/CV methodology to be worse
than the VFT and LP alternatives. The BN alternative is evaluated as Infeasible
in the computational overhead objective. As the state-space of a combat simulation
grows, this methodology becomes infeasible to apply. We hypothesize that the BN
alternative would be infeasible for most DoD combat models, but may be applicable
in other gaming areas. For our purposes, we therefore determine the BN alternative
to be worse than the VFT and LP alternatives.
Between the VFT and LP alternatives, Table 11 illustrates that these two methodologies are fairly comparable. While the VFT evaluation distribution is heavily
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Table 11: Evaluation Distributions by Objective
Evaluation
Alternative Inf. Poor Fair Good Excellent
CE/CV
0
3
2
4
0
BN 0.5 1.5
0
5
2
0
1
2
6
0
VFT
0
0
2
5
2
LP
skewed-left with a mode of “Good”, the LP distribution is centered on “Good.”
However, the VFT methodology does not have any “Excellent” evaluations. Overall,
the LP methodology appears to be the best alternative from both Table 10 and Table
11.
While the LP objective appears to be the best, we can take key components from
other methodologies considered here to create a new alternative. The intent is that
this new alternative’s set of evaluations would be better than any of the current four
alternatives. Keeney calls this process “alternative creation” (27). By combining the
the VFT and LP methodologies, we can obtain an alternative better than all four of
the methodologies hitherto discussed. We will refer to this alternative as the VFT-LP
alternative.
The new VFT-LP alternative utilizes the VFT methodology as the main assessment structure, and then leverages the optimization of the LP in order to perform
formative assessment and enhance the efficacy of the VFT’s assessment. Consider
the following approach. In order to perform the VFT-LP assessment, first create a
VFT Objectives Hierarchy as described in Sections 3.2.3 and 4.4. Also, devise a linear
program to take any desired weights (e.g., asset weights, objective weights, mission
weights) from the VFT and optimize them for use in the next time-step’s VFT assessment. The LP should be run after a time-step’s VFT assessment, in order to aid
the allocation for next time-step.
Note that the LP could be run before the VFT assessment. However, we may
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use the LP to optimize weights, potentially including asset and mission weights.
Therefore, applying the LP between adjudication and assessment would provide an
assessment based on weights that were not used in the current time-step’s allocation,
and therefore would less accurately assess friendly and enemy forces. Running the
LP after assessment will not only update these values for the next time-step’s assessment, but also can update these weights for other parts of the simulation, including
allocation and adjudication modules.
To instantiate the VFT-LP methodology, consider the following example extending the VFT applied to Dresher’s Game in Section 4.4. Rather than utilizing the
subsequent LP to find an optimal allocation, we focus on the five objective weights
(wECB , wF CB wF CF , wECF , and wC ). These are the five decision variables in the LP
to follow. Since the VFT hierarchy from Section 4.4 did not utilize the asset weights
Pb and Pf , we do not utilize them here. However, the VFT and following LP’s objective function could be modified to resemble that of the objectives and objective
function, respectively, from our LP application to Dresher’s Game in Section 4.5. Doing so would include these asset weights as decision variables. We then reclassify all
allocation variables (i.e., Sbb,B,i , Sbf,B,i , Sf,B,i , Sbb,R,i , Sbf,R,i , Sf,R,i ) parameters. These
allocation variables take on the values from the end of the current time-step. All other
parameters retain their parameters classification. Our objective is the same as from
the LP application to Dresher’s Game in Section 4.5 – maximize the cost and two
enemy capability objectives. However, we utilize the enemy and friendly capability
objectives from the VFT construction, which are slightly different from those of the
LP application. With these changes, consider the following sample LP:
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ben,i+1
fen,i+1
max
wECB,i+1 1 −
+ wECF,i+1 1 −
ben,1
fen,1




bf r,i+1
ff r,i+1
+ wF CB,i+1
+ wF CF,i+1
bf r,1
ff r,1


Cbb Sbb,f r,i + Cbf Sbf,f r,i + Cf Sf,f r,i + P Ci
+ wC,i+1 1 −
Cbb bf r,i + Cf ff r,i + P Ci

(58)

s.t

wECB,i+1 + wECF,i+1 + wF CB,i+1 + wF CF,i+1 + wC,i+1 = 1

(59)

wECB,i+1 , wF CB,i+1 , wF CF,i+1 , wECF,i+1 , wC,i+1 ≥ 0

(60)

wECB,i+1 , wF CB,i+1 , wF CF,i+1 , wECF,i+1 , wC,i+1 ≥ 

(61)

wECB,i+1 − wECB,i
≤ δECB
wECB,i
wECB,i+1 − wECB,i
≥ −δECB
wECB,i
wECF,i+1 − wECF,i
≤ δECF
wECF,i
wECF,i+1 − wECF,i
≥ −δECF
wECF,i
wF CB,i+1 − wF CB,i
≤ δF CB
wF CB,i
wF CB,i+1 − wF CB,i
≥ −δF CB
wF CB,i
wF CF,i+1 − wF CF,i
≤ δF CF
wF CF,i
wF CF,i+1 − wF CF,i
≥ −δF CF
wF CF,i
wC,i+1 − wC,i
≤ δC
wC,i
wC,i+1 − wC,i
≥ −δC
wC,i

(62)
(63)
(64)
(65)
(66)
(67)
(68)
(69)
(70)
(71)

For this LP, we vary the values of the next time-step’s weights, and so the decision
variables have time-step index i+1. The objective function (58) minimizes the enemy
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capability objectives and the cost objective, while maximizing the friendly capability
objective.
There are two main constraints. Constraint (59) ensures that the objective function value remains in the interval [0,1]. Constraint (60) is the typical non-negativity
constraint, which effectually sets the domain of each decision variable to [0,1] when
coupled with Constraint (59).
Constraints (61) – (71) are optional, and are provided here as ideas for changing
the behavior of this LP. Optional Constraint (61) would ensure that each weight is
strictly positive. This optional constraint could also be broken out with different 
values for each weight, if desired. Constraints (62) – (71) would force the proportional
change in the value of a weight to be restricted from one time-step to another. So,
if one would not want there to be more than a 5% change (i.e., increase or decrease)
in the enemy capability objectives’ weights from one time-step to another, one could
set δECB = δECF = 0.05. Limiting the change could be useful to obtain asymptotic
behavior toward the overall optimal weights for the objectives, rather than highly
variable or quickly flat-lining behavior. A slower change would also allow for different
missions to have a more dominant effect upon the overall assessment, rather than
allowing missions conducted at the beginning of a scenario to have the most significant
impact on the objective weights.
At the beginning of time-step 1, the objective weights were
2
15
1
=
5

wECB,1 =
wF CF,1

1
5
1
=
3

wECF,1 =
wC,1

wF CB,1 =

2
15

Now, suppose that we let  = 0.001 and δECB = δECF = δF CB = δF CF = δC = 0.5.
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Then, the optimal solution for time-step 2’s weights is

[wECB,2 , wECF,2 , wF CB,2 , wF CF,2 , wC,2 ] = [1/5, 2/15, 1/5, 3/10, 1/6]

(72)

These results are very sensitive in relation to the set of δ parameters. For example,
changing δC to equal 0.6 changes the optimal solution to

[wECB,2 , wECF,2 , wF CB,2 , wF CF,2 , wC,2 ] = [1/5, 1/6, 1/5, 3/10, 2/15]

(73)

The purpose of a lower delta value is to only slightly change the objective weights
to reflect a good balance. Clearly, having the set of delta values equal 1 would set
the weights of the highest-achieving objectives as large as possible, while setting the
lowest-achieving objectives closer to . Limiting the change prevents early time-steps’
allocations and adjudications from immediately setting (a) weight(s) to 1 or .
Table 12: VFT-LP Evaluation – Categorical Labels
Objective Category
Realism

Efficiency

Robusticity

Objective
Simplistic
Complete & Accurate
Comprehensive
Assumptions
Computation
Modular
Win/Loss
Equitable Across Domains
Correlations btwn Objectives

Evaluation
Fair
Good
Good
Good
Good
Excellent
Good
Good
Excellent

Table 12 provides the set of evaluations for the VFT-LP alternative. The VFTLP alternative maintains the Simplicity of Communication from the original VFT
methodology, due to the potential for multi-objective attributes to allow for reporting
on objectives correlations. This alternative’s evaluation for the Completeness and
Accuracy and the Comprehensive across All Domains objectives is also the same as
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for the VFT methodology, since the assessment mechanism has not changed.
Under the Efficiency objective, the addition of the LP to the backend of the VFT
methodology does not incur any additional assumptions on the enemy’s allocation.
No additional data for these allocations is required, either. The evaluation is therefore equal to that of the VFT alternative. However, the Computational Overhead
decreases, since we no longer have to go through the decision process of determining
accurate weights with a proxy decision-maker. While creating the VFT takes some
initialization with a proxy decision-maker, obtaining appropriate attribute weights
can be a laborious process (27, p. 147–149, 166-171). We have replaced this initialization task with the above LP process. Instead, we now only require any (arbitrary)
weights to initialize the model, and the LP will adjust the weights at each time-step.
Therefore, the evaluation fo the Computational Overhead objective is “Good.” Lastly,
with the additional formative feedback that the LP provides, the likely included asset
weights incorporate resource and asset gaps. We therefore evaluate this alternative
as “Excellent” for the Modular objective.
Under the Robusticity objective, we maintain the Win/Loss and Equitable Across
Domains evaluations from the VFT methodology, which were “Good.” For the Correlations Between Objectives objective, not only may we utilize multi-objective attributes, but we now consider the trade-offs between weighting different objectives
and their impact on the overall objective function value with the addition of the LP.
Therefore, we evaluate the VFT-LP alternative as “Excellent” for this objective.
Table 13: Evaluation Distributions by Objective for Top 3 Methodologies
Evaluation
Alternative Inf. Poor Fair Good Excellent
VFT-LP
0
0
1
6
2
LP
0
0
2
5
2
0
1
2
6
0
VFT
Table 13 provides the evaluation distributions for the top three alternatives. While
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still comparable to the LP methodology’s evaluation distribution, the VFT-LP evaluations clearly outshine those of the VFT methodology. Note that the VFT-LP is
evaluated as slightly better than the LP, with the VFT-LP having moved one “Fair”
evaluation to “Good.” Overall, the VFT-LP methodology has a better evaluation distribution than all of the other considered alternatives. The created alternative also
provides useful feedback internal to a simulation of warfare. We recommend use of
this methodology for combat simulation within the DoD.
In this chapter, we evaluated the four assessment alternatives detailed in Chapter
III and applied in Chapter IV. After evaluating the LP and VFT methodologies as
better than the CE/CV and BN methodologies, we searched for ways to improve upon
these approaches. Specifically, we merged the two highest-evaluated alternatives to
create a new VFT-LP methodology, which resulted in a better evaluation of this
alternative than the other four alternatives. We also provided some examples of
using an LP to optimize the overall objective function by selecting different objective
weights. The next chapter provides conclusory thoughts on the research presented
in this thesis and suggests some aspects of the current research to continue in future
work.
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VI. Conclusion

There is very little research on combat assessment methodologies, although this
area of research’s implications for DoD conduct could be far-reaching. While the
strategy-to-task framework outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2) provides a skeletal structure for military combat and non-combat assessment, there is a lack of guidance for how to carry out that guidance in operational models. This thesis distills
the available DoD guidance alongside attributes from other predominant assessment
areas to develop a reasonably good methodology for application in United States
military combat simulations. We rely heavily upon the Value-Focused Thinking principles provided by Keeney (27) to guide our evaluation, as this technique is expert at
distilling qualitative information into a structured evaluation hierarchy. Embedded in
this hierarchy are nine criteria that provide an answer to our first research question
(“what are the desired characteristics of a combat assessment methodology?”). In
particular, we selected the characteristics from JCS doctrine and practice to guide
the value hierarchy while incorporating applicable aspects of other assessment research:

1. Simplicity of Communication

2. Completeness & Accuracy

3. Comprehensive Across All Domains

4. Limit Adversary Allocation Assumptions

5. Limit Computational Overhead

6. Modularity

7. Provide Win/Loss/Unresolved Categories

8. Domain Equity

9. Objectives Correlations

We have added the application of each methodology to a small problem in order
to more accurately evaluate each technique in relation to our value hierarchy. However, this work does not integrate assessment into a large combat simulation. Future
research could develop the theory and/or application of combat assessment within
large simulations. For example, BEAM currently utilizes stochastic asset health as
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the output of a singular thread. In this work, we have considered only deterministic
asset health distributions for the LP methodology.
Coupled with stochastic asset health is partial termination of a scenario. BEAM
currently integrates this idea at the thread level by terminating whole threads, weighted
by the probability of that thread occurring. However, only a portion of the thread
may be truly lost. Future research could apply mathematical programming to tackle
this problem.
A significant constraint of the assessment methodologies presented in this work
is the assumption of their symmetry. We have assumed that both Blue and Red
forces consider alignment with JCS doctrine a priority when assessing operational
environment outcomes. A great advance in the field would be to determine a realistic
assessment structure and methodology for a general or specific Red actor.
The alternatives we selected for evaluation in this work are by no means comprehensive. However, the CE/CV methodology provided a status-quo alternative,
which has been applied inside of an enterprise-level combat simulation. In addition, the BN, VFT, and LP approaches broadly span the types of methodologies we
could have investigated. The BN methodology is built on Bayesian statistics and a
heavy distributional base. The network aspect of this approach is typical of nonhierarchical assessment. The VFT approach, in contrast, is rigidly hierarchical and
requires multiple types of independence. In this model, we demonstrate the strengths
and weaknesses of an additive model for assessment within simulated combat. Lastly,
the LP approach is intended to demonstrate the pros and cons of general mathematical programming for assessment within a simulation of combat. In fact, the examples
presented are mixed-integer linear programs. As an answer to our second research
question (”how should one conduct combat assessment?”), we suggest utilizing the
Value-Focused Thinking – Linear Programming approach.
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The examples of these techniques that we present in chapter IV are foundational
approaches from applied statistics and operations research and do not represent the
wealth of complexity that each technique has to offer. However, by detailing the
mechanics, and exemplifying basic examples, of these methodologies, we intend for
our evaluations to provide only mild error when extrapolated to more nuanced versions
of these techniques. In sum, we consider the archetypal examples considered in this
work to adequately span potential quantitative assessment techniques.
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Appendix A. Dresher’s Game Conditional Probability
Tables for the Bayesian Network Methodology

Sf,R,2
p(Sf,R,2 )

Sbb,R,2
p(Sbb,R,2 )

0
0.2

0
0.3

1
0.08

1
0.12

Sbf,R,2
p(Sbf,R,2 )
Sbf,R,2
p(Sbf,R,2 )

Table 14: Distribution of Sf,R,2
2
3
4
5
6
0.05 0.025 0.004 0.001 0.02

7
0.07

8
0.1

Table 15: Distribution of Sbb,R,2
2
3
4
5
6
0.045 0.02 0.012 0.006 0.012

7
0.02

8
0.045

0
0.66591
6
0.00659

Table 16: Distribution of Sbf,R,2
1
2
3
4
0.07832 0.02445 0.008065 0.004424
7
8
9
10
0.0146 0.03075 0.0714
0.093

Sf,B,2
p(Sf,B,2 )

0
0.0939

Table 17: Distribution of Sf,B,2
1
2
3
4
5
0.0244 0.0609 0.0061 0.0478 0.013

6
0.1084

Sbb,B,2
p(Sbb,B,2 )

0
0.202

Table 18: Distribution of Sbb,B,2
1
2
3
4
5
0.0205 0.0624 0.0061 0.044 0.0075

6
0.027

Sbf,B,2
p(Sbf,B,2 )

0
0.5879

Table 19: Distribution of Sbf,B,2
1
2
3
4
5
0.0818 0.0102 0.0033 0.0007 0.0026
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9
0.2

10
0.25

9
0.12

10
0.3

5
0.002491

7
0.1125

7
0.0627

6
0.0139

8
0.5331

8
0.5677

7
0.0838

8
0.2157

Sbb,B,2 \Sf,R,2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Sbb,B,2 \Sf,R,2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Table 20: Distribution of Sbf,B,2 |Sf,R,2
0
1
2
3
1
0.02
0.008
0.0003
0
0.25
0.01
0.0009
0
0.73
0.075
0.0013
0
0
0.11
0.0021
0
0
0.797
0.09
0
0
0
0.12
0
0
0
0.7854
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
7
8
9
0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001
0.000028 0.000028 0.000028 0.000028
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.00082 0.00082 0.00082 0.00082
0.0029
0.0029
0.0029
0.0029
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.011
0.011
0.011
0.011
0.097
0.097
0.097
0.097
0.880942 0.880942 0.880942 0.880942

4
5
0.00004 0.00001
0.00005 0.000028
0.00009
0.0003
0.00126 0.00082
0.0069
0.0029
0.013
0.007
0.087
0.011
0.143
0.097
0.74866 0.880942
10
0.00001
0.000028
0.0003
0.00082
0.0029
0.007
0.011
0.097
0.880942

Table 21: Distribution of Sbf,R,2 |Sbb,R,2
Sbf,R,2 \Sbb,R,2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0
0.31
0.13
0.04
0.01
0.0075
0.005
0.0075
0.01
0.04
0.13
0.31

1
0.35
0.13
0.045
0.02
0.01
0.005
0.02
0.05
0.1
0.27
0

2
0.45
0.2
0.06
0.025
0.01
0.005
0.02
0.08
0.15
0
0

3
0.55
0.195
0.07
0.03
0.01
0.005
0.04
0.1
0
0
0
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4
0.645
0.185
0.09
0.04
0.015
0.005
0.02
0
0
0
0

5
0.71
0.175
0.07
0.03
0.014
0.001
0
0
0
0
0

6
0.78
0.15
0.05
0.015
0.005
0
0
0
0
0
0

7
0.86
0.115
0.02
0.005
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

8
0.94
0.05
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

9
0.99
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

10
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Sbb,R,2 \Sf,B,2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0.003
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.1
0.18
0.213

Table 22: Distribution
1
2
3
0.002 0.05 0.11
0.003 0.02 0.03
0.005 0.03 0.01
0.21 0.002 0.007
0.16 0.003 0.012
0.1
0.05 0.023
0.05 0.08 0.069
0.01 0.12 0.097
0.05 0.16 0.137
0.15 0.19 0.215
0.26 0.295 0.29

Table
0
0.086
0.03
0.01
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.01
0.06
0.8

Sbb,B,2 \Sbf,B,2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

of Sbb,R,2 |Sf,B,2
4
5
0.12 0.16
0.03
0.1
0.015 0.003
0.01 0.03
0.015 0.012
0.045 0.015
0.085 0.03
0.09 0.07
0.09 0.115
0.18 0.165
0.32
0.3

6
7
8
0.18 0.21 0.35
0.13 0.16 0.12
0.06
0.1
0.06
0.03 0.05 0.03
0.009 0.01 0.003
0.005 0.005 0.001
0.009 0.01 0.001
0.02 0.035 0.002
0.1
0.05 0.07
0.187 0.12 0.15
0.27 0.25 0.213

23: Distribution of Sbf,B,2 |Sbb,B,2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 8
0.1076 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.58 0.1 0.2 1
0.06 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.28 0.3 0.8 0
0.0164 0.008 0.037 0.065 0.1 0.6 0 0
0.0086 0.096 0.107 0.223 0.04 0
0 0
0.001 0.16
0.3
0.7
0
0
0 0
0.0164 0.15 0.55
0
0
0
0 0
0.12
0.58
0
0
0
0
0 0
0.67
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0

Table 24: Distribution of Sf,B,2 |Sbb,R,2 , Sbf,R,2
Sbb,R,2 + Sbf,R,2 \Sf,B
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0
1
0.01
0.001
0.0001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001

1
0
0.3
0.002
0.0005
0.00004
0.00004
0.00004
0.00004
0.00004
0.00004
0.00004

2
0
0.69
0.1
0.0014
0.00025
0.00025
0.00025
0.00025
0.00025
0.00025
0.00025
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3
0
0
0.12
0.0055
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003

4
0
0
0.777
0.1505
0.0084
0.0084
0.0084
0.0084
0.0084
0.0084
0.0084

5
0
0
0
0.192
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

6
0
0
0
0.65
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12

7
0
0
0
0
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15

8
0
0
0
0
0.711
0.711
0.711
0.711
0.711
0.711
0.711

Sbb,B,2 \Sbf,B,2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Table 25: Distribution of Sbf,B,2 |Sbb,B,2 , Sf,R,2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.983 0.017
0
0
0
0
0
0.96 0.034 0.006
0
0
0
0
0.88
0.1
0.015 0.005
0
0
0
0.79 0.133 0.065 0.011 0.001
0
0
0.73 0.17 0.067 0.027 0.001 0.005
0
0.6 0.139 0.072 0.0035 0.001 0.0045 0.18
0.45 0.086 0.0164 0.0086 0.001 0.007 0.09
0.38 0.11 0.006 0.0035 0.001 0.0035 0.006

7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.341
0.11

8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.38

Table 26: Distribution of Sbf,R,2 |Sbb,R,2 , Sf,B,2
Sbb,R,2 \Sbf,R,2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0
1
0.99
0.94
0.86
0.78
0.71
0.645
0.55
0.45
0.35
0.31

1
0
0.01
0.05
0.115
0.15
0.175
0.185
0.195
0.2
0.13
0.13

2
0
0
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.07
0.09
0.07
0.06
0.045
0.04

3
0
0
0
0.005
0.015
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.025
0.02
0.01

4
0
0
0
0
0.005
0.014
0.015
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.0075

5
0
0
0
0
0
0.001
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005

6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.0075

7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1
0.08
0.05
0.01

8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.15
0.1
0.04

9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.27
0.13

10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.31

Table 27: Distribution of Sf,R,2 |Sbb,B,2 , Sbf,B,2
Sbb,B,2 + Sbf,B,2 \Sf,R,2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

0
0.95
0.002
0.0007
0.0007
0.0007
0.0007
0.0007
0.0007
0.0007

1
0.05
0.3
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

2
0
0.698
0.042
0.042
0.042
0.042
0.042
0.042
0.042

3
0
0
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
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4
0
0
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005

5
0
0
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001

6
0
0
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005

7
0
0
0.3175
0.3375
0.3375
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04

8
0
0
0.5688
0.5688
0.5688
0.054
0.054
0.054
0.054

9
0
0
0
0
0
0.2623
0.2623
0.2623
0.2623

10
0
0
0
0
0
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
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